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Abstract 
Private elementary schools in Mexico are usually seen by wealthy and middle-
class families as an alternative to public education. However, private schools have not 
been seen until very recently as an academic alternative for the poor. In my dissertation, I 
used data on students from poor families (beneficiaries of Oportunidades program) 
attending sixth grade of elementary school, who participated in the Quality and 
Educational Achievement Test assessment 2009 (EXCALE06-2009), to evaluate if there 
is a private school advantage for the poor in Mathematics in Mexico. I also investigated 
the extent to what achievement differential is explained by important features of private 
schools, such as physical resources, school management, teacher quality, teaching 
practices and classroom organization, and peer group composition. I used propensity 
score-matching to correct for bias arising from the self-sorting of students into type of 
schools. 
I concluded that private schools in Mexico offer a clear advantage for poor 
students in elementary education, even after accounting for selection bias. On average, 
private school students who are beneficiaries of Oportunidades program outperformed 
their public counterparts by 48 test points in Mathematics, or 48% of a standard 
deviation. The results passed different robustness checks and are technically reliable.  
The 0.48 sd effect size of private school is larger relative to much of the existing 
literature, especially if it is compared to the results of true experiments or quasi-
experiments of private schools conducted in the U.S. I hypothesize that these large results 
might have to do in part with two factors: the use of the right counterfactual for this 
research: poor students attending private urban schools; and the fact that students in the 
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sample attending private schools are all beneficiaries of Oportunidades, a comprehensive 
poverty alleviation program. This might mean that the treatment under study is more 
complex than just private schooling. 
After statistically accounting for selection bias, all of the remaining private school 
effect is accounted for by identifiable school factors. Peer group composition, school 
management, teacher practices and classroom organization, are the most important 
factors explaining the private school advantage in Mathematics in elementary schools in 
Mexico. 
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Introduction 
Private elementary and lower-secondary schools are usually seen as an alternative 
to public education for wealthy and middle-class families. However, in many developing 
countries, private schools serve an increasing number of middle-class and poor students 
(Akaguri, 2013; Alderman, Kim, & Orazem, 2003; Angrist, Bettinger, Bloom, King, & 
Kremer, 2002; Psacharopoulos, Arieira, & Mattson, 1997; Tooley & Dixon, 2007; Uribe, 
Murnane, Willett, & Somers, 2006; Wolff & de Moura Castro, 2002). In Mexico, for 
instance, affordable private schools are starting to help meet the excess demand for 
elementary and lower-secondary education and, in the process, releasing pressure on an 
overflowing public educational system (Bracho & Zamudio, 1998; Velez Bustillo, 2001). 
Also, with Mexico’s primary public schools1 -- especially those attended by the poor -- 
facing problems of inadequate resources (Treviño & Treviño, 2004), prolonged teacher 
strikes, and low scores for their students on standardized tests (INEE, 2006) -- it should 
not come as a surprise that middle-class and poor parents who are seeking educational 
quality are starting to enroll their children in affordable elementary private schools. 
It is often simply assumed that private schools are more effective than their public 
school counterparts in enhancing their students’ academic achievement (see Somers et 
al.,(2001) to see some examples). However, there is no sound empirical evidence, as yet, 
that this assumption holds for the affordable private schools that are now being chosen by 
the poor in Mexico, and whose performance I will examine in this thesis, nor is there any 
indication as to what the determinants of any differential in student achievement, by 
sector, might be.  In addition to investigating differences in student academic 
                                                
1 In Mexico, basic education is mandatory and comprises elementary education (grades 1 through 6) and 
lower-secondary education (grades 7 through 9). 
2 A theoretical economic framework that explains the size of the private education sector across countries 
can be found in Estelle James (1987, 1993). Also, see Somers et al. (2001) for an application of the same 
framework to the Latin American context.  
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performance between the public and private sectors in Mexico, at the elementary level, I 
also investigate how any achievement differential that I detect differs by important 
features of the educational system in Mexico, including physical resources, school 
management, teacher quality, and teaching practices and classroom organization, as best 
as the available proxies for those constructs allow. I am also analyzing the role that the 
student’s peer group has on the private school achievement differential, a recurrent 
explanatory factor of educational achievement. In my research, I use data on primary 
students from poor families, who participated in the Quality and Educational 
Achievement Test assessment (EXCALE) conducted by the National Institute for 
Educational Evaluation (INEE), during the academic year 2009-2010. Excale is a school 
survey and assessment administered to a nationally representative stratified random 
sample of schools, in which students are given a curriculum based test in the subjects of 
Mathematics, Spanish, Natural Sciences and Civic Education, and a self-administered 
questionnaire that covers household information, and student’s perception about different 
factors that include characteristics of the instruction they experience, and home 
background. Teachers and school principals are also given surveys, which covers 
different aspects of the school life and characteristics that go from school physical and 
educational resources to teacher and principal practices. My research is observational, 
rather than experimental (in which children are randomized to private and public schools) 
and so, I am using propensity score-matching to assess the sensitivity of my findings to 
selection bias (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). 
The analysis that I will present and discuss in this study shows that there is indeed 
a private school advantage for the poor in Mexico in mathematics, even after accounting 
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for selection bias. I also show that after statistically accounting for the effect of 
achievement of peer group composition, the remaining achievement differential can be 
explained by school factors, such as physical resources, school management, teacher 
quality, and teaching practices and classroom organization. 
 
1. Comparing Student Achievement in Public and Private Schools 
1.1. Background On Private Education and The Poor In Mexico 
Ten years ago, there was an increase in the supply of private education in Mexico, 
as measured by the total number of private schools and by the share of total enrollment 
that attends private schools. At the elementary education level (grades 1 through 6), the 
proportion of the total student enrollment educated in private schools in Mexico rose 
from 6.2% in 1996 to 8.1% in 2004. At the lower-secondary level (grades 9 through 12), 
private enrollment reached a peak of 13.8% of total student enrollment in 2001, and then 
leveled out at 12.6%. According to the 1999 Economic Census of the National Institute of 
Statistics and Geography (INEGI, for its acronym in Spanish), the number of private 
establishments dedicated to educational services grew by 34% from 1999 to 2009 (de la 
Calle & Rubio, 2012). However, the most reliable data to really appreciate the size of the 
private education center comes from Census of Schools, Teachers, Students of Basic and 
Especial Education 2014 (CEMABE for its acronym in Spanish). This is the first physical 
census conducted in Mexico to really count the number of schools, teachers and students 
in basic and especial education in the country. Table 1 presents the number and 
percentage of public and private schools at different educational levels.  
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Table 1: Number and percentage of public and private schools in Mexico, 
broken down by educational level 
  Public Schools Private Schools 
 Educational Level No. % Private % Total 
Preschool 48,620 77% 14,737 23% 63,357 
Primary Education 68,544 89% 8,668 11% 77,212 
Lower-Secondary 27,020 85% 4,717 15% 31,737 
TOTAL 144,184 84% 28,122 16% 172,306 
Source: statistics computed by the author based on information from the CEMABE 2014 
(database retrieved from: http://imco.org.mx/banner_es/datos-publicos-del-censo-educativo/ on 
October 1, 2014) 
 
According to the CEMABE 2014 data, 11% of primary schools are private. 
Previous statistics from the educational sector  -- computed based on number of students 
and not number of schools – indicated that the percentage of students in private primary 
schools had never been higher than 8.1%. However, this does not necessarily suggest that 
the private educational sector grew in any way after the last peak registered ten years ago. 
Private schools are, on average, smaller than public schools. Therefore, it is completely 
possible that private schools account for only 8.1 percent of the enrollment, but account 
for 11 percent of total number of schools. Educational authorities are going to release the 
statistics of student enrollment of the CEMABE 2014 in the next months, which would 
give us the opportunity to see if the private education sector has grown in term of actual 
student enrolment and not only in terms on the number of schools.  
Traditionally, private education has been an option only for wealthy or middle-
class families that can afford to pay tuition fees. However, there are some recent 
indications that families with more precarious economic conditions, and even the poor, 
have begun to participate in this modality of education. For example, Bracho and 
Zamudio (1998) analyzed survey data on household income and expenditure 
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administered by the Mexican Government in 1992, and reported that, out of the total 
number of families that admit having children in elementary private schools, 10.1% 
belong in the three lowest income deciles.  
The availability of private schools for families from very different economic 
status in Mexico, resembles the educational supply conditions observed in other 
developing countries, such as Bolivia (Psacharopoulos et al., 1997), Chile and Haiti 
(Wolff & de Moura Castro, 2002), Colombia (Angrist, Bettinger, Bloom, King, & 
Kremer, 2002) Ghana (Akaguri, 2013), India (Tooley & Dixon, 2007), Nigeria (Tooley, 
2005), and Pakistan (Alderman et al., 2003). In some cases, the increase in private school 
demand has been driven by an insufficient supply of public schools and the 
disenchantment of parents and students with respect to public school quality. The fact 
that in some countries, like Ghana (Akaguri, 2013) and Mexico (Treviño, 2005), public 
education is not really free –it usually entails direct and indirect expenditures such as 
uniforms and the payment of school imposed fees- makes low-fee private schools 
attractive to some poor families, since they seem to represent a more effective 
substitution for public schools. In other cases, the increase has been driven by 
government policies (James, 1993).  
Since there is no empirical evidence examining the determinants and predictors of 
the demand for basic private education in Mexico, it is not known why the poor are 
interested in the private educational sector. Research on this topic from other Latin 
American countries suggests that the poor may be opting for private education for their 
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children because of important characteristics of the school market place2. For example, 
one hypothesis is that insufficient provision of public education in the region may be 
responsible for increasing the demand for private schools. Or, parents may be turning to 
private schools because they perceive that the public schools are of poor quality, even if 
the change places a financial burden on the family.  
In Mexico, both hypotheses are plausible. At the elementary education level, the 
coverage is almost universal across all economic strata; therefore, an increasing demand 
for private education may be better explained by the poor educational quality of public 
schools (Treviño & Treviño, 2004). What little concrete empirical evidence exists – that 
is, qualitative evaluations of Oportunidades, a transfer program that provides financial 
resources to almost all poor families in Mexico, conditional on enrolling their children in 
school -- provide accounts of poor parents opting for affordable elementary private 
schools for their children because of their perceptions of the inadequate quality of public 
schools (Escobar Latapí & González de la Rocha, 2003).  
 
1.2 Is There A Private School Advantage? 
The debate of whether there is a private school advantage sparked in 1982, after 
Coleman, Hoffer and Kilgore presented the results of their analysis using the High School 
and Beyond data (1982) and the latter publication of their final research results (Coleman, 
Hoffer, & Kilgore, 1982). Their main finding was that private high schools, particularly 
Catholic high schools, are more effective than public schools in enhancing the cognitive 
                                                
2 A theoretical economic framework that explains the size of the private education sector across countries 
can be found in Estelle James (1987, 1993). Also, see Somers et al. (2001) for an application of the same 
framework to the Latin American context.  
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skills of their students. Also, a key finding of that study is that there were even larger 
differences in social outcomes between students and private and public high schools.  
This conclusion became widely criticized by the research community, especially 
because the original study did not include any technique to account for the effect of 
selection bias (Murnane, Newstead, & Olsen, 1985). Researchers reanalyzing the data 
suggested that the methods used by Coleman and his colleagues were not of the highest 
technical standards and concluded that their results were not warranted by the evidence 
(Goldberger & Cain, 1982). Their conclusion was that students at Catholic private 
schools do not do better or worse than their public school counterparts in the outcomes 
examined of reading and mathematics (Noell, 1982; Witte, 1992).  
The issue is, however, far from concluded. Other studies, using different 
techniques for accounting for selection bias, have concluded that there is indeed a private 
school advantage, especially for disadvantage children. After accounting for sample 
selection bias using different instruments, Evans and Schwab (1995) found that attending 
a private Catholic high school raises the likelihood of finishing high school or entering 
college by as much as thirteen percentage points. This is consistent with the results found 
by Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) analyzing the same outcomes, although they also 
analyzed the private school effect on achievement, which had no significant effect. Along 
the same lines, Sander and Krautmann (1995) found, using a different set of instruments 
for accounting for selection bias, that sophomores attending a Catholic school are more 
likely to graduate than sophomore in public schools. 
The Catholic private school advantage appears to be larger for minority groups. 
Neal (1997) found that urban minority students attending Catholic schools increase the 
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probability of high school graduation and college graduation, for those graduating high 
school. The private school advantage even seems to continue into affecting future wage 
gains.  
Other researchers have analyzed the effect of private education in older adults 
(Sander, 2000) and the effect of private primary schools (Jepsen, 2003), both with 
positive results.  
The question of whether private schools are more effective than public schools in 
increasing the achievement of students in Latin America does not have a definitive 
answer. In addition to existing research on this topic being sparse, variation in the local 
contexts, the educational systems, the modalities of the schools, and the different 
populations, make generalization difficult.  
A comparison of student performance in public and private schools can be made 
within two different educational contexts: one in which an educational market prevails, 
and the other in which the provision of education is mainly public (Gradstein, Justman, & 
Meier, 2004; James, 1987, 1993). The first context tends to foster policies aimed at 
facilitating an expansion of the demand and supply of private education, one example 
being the creation and implementation of programs that provide private-school tuition 
vouchers (Angrist et al., 2002). Commonly, in this context, after policies are 
implemented, there are dramatic increases in the demand for private schools by families 
from the middle and lower socio-economic tiers (McEwan, 2001; Uribe et al., 2006).  
The second context is characterized by the predominance of the state in the provision of 
elementary education. In this context, private schools are mostly attended by students 
from families in the middle and high socio-economic tiers, and the expansion of private 
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education itself is not promoted directly by the state (Gradstein et al., 2004). Private 
school advantage means something different in contexts where only a very small 
proportion of the poor attends private schools, compared to contexts where a greater 
share of them does. The Mexican case fits into the former category, since there are no 
policies in place aimed at increasing the demand for private education or facilitating the 
expansion of the private education supply. Therefore, most of the students who attend 
private schools belong to families of middle to high socioeconomic status3 (Treviño & 
Treviño, 2004; Velez Bustillo, 2001). In this system, private schools appear more 
effective at enhancing the achievement of students (Treviño & Treviño, 2004), even after 
controlling for possible influences on achievement that may stem from students’ exposure 
to the peer groups of differential quality present in public and private schools (Fernández, 
2003). However, one needs to express caution in interpreting these findings as indicating 
that an education in the private schools is superior, as the populations attending each type 
of school are highly self-selected and from different socioeconomic backgrounds (INEE, 
2006).  
In other Latin American countries that do not possess educational market systems, 
such as Argentina or Brazil, findings for a private school advantage are not conclusive 
either (Somers et al., 2001). In fact, in these countries, once differences in student 
characteristics between the public and private sector are controlled, the differential 
impact of private school on student achievement tends to zero (Somers et al., 2001). On 
the other hand, researchers have found that students in eighth grade attending private 
                                                
3 In these studies, the variables measuring socioeconomic status (SES) are indirect. SES is usually 
measured by indexes that are composed by variables indicating different levels of physical and economic 
wellbeing. Unfortunately, none of the large-scale evaluation programs, such as those conducted by the 
INEE or the Secretary of Education, include direct measures of family income.  
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school in the Dominican Republic scored higher in mathematics tests than their 
counterparts in public schools, after controlling for socio-economic status, previous 
achievement and systematic selection by type of school. This latter finding is confirmed 
even when the impact of non-elite private schools, like the O-type private schools, which 
cater in great part to the poor, is examined (Jimenez, Lockheed, Luna, & Paqueo, 1991). 
In the same line, there are two studies in Colombia that also find a private school 
advantage. Angrist and his colleagues (2002) evaluated the impact of PACES, a program 
that randomly grants educational vouchers that partially cover the cost of private 
secondary school. They found that three years after the granting of a voucher, students 
who won the voucher and subsequently attended private schools scored an average of 0.2 
standard deviations higher on achievement tests. Cox and Jimenez (1991) found that 
private secondary schools in Colombia do offer an achievement advantage, even after 
comparing students in observationally equivalent settings.  
In some developing countries outside of the Latin American region, researchers 
have found a trend in the provision of private schooling for the poor (Tooley, 2008). In 
poor areas of Lagos State, Nigeria, for example, 71 percent of schools were found to be 
private (Tooley, 2005). Similar expansion of the private educational sector has been seen 
in other countries, such as Uganda, Tanzania and Malawi (Tooley & Dixon, 2006). There 
is not, however, conclusive evidence to sustain the statement that private schools are 
more effective at promoting student achievement than public schools. Despite the fact 
that in many of these studies there is evidence that private schools expose students to 
much more teaching activity (Tooley, 2005; Tooley & Dixon, 2007), technical limitations 
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in the studies prevent us from drawing any definitive conclusion about difference in 
student achievement between public and private schools.  
Comparisons of student achievement between public and private schools in 
countries with voucher-type programs in place have also produced inconclusive findings. 
The most important case in this category is Chile. In 1980 the military Chilean 
government introduced a reform aimed at financing public and most private schools with 
the provision of vouchers. As a result, the educational sectors experienced one of the 
most rapid and large privatizations of education ever registered. However, after more 
than three decades after the reform, there is no definitive answer as to whether private 
schools are more effective at producing academic achievement than public schools 
(McEwan, 2001; McEwan & Carnoy, 2000). On the one hand, private subsidized non-
religious schools appear to provide no real academic advantage over municipally 
administered public schools. On the other hand, Catholic-voucher schools seem to be 
somewhat more effective than public schools, but only marginally. In addition to that, the 
transformation of the education market obtained through the elimination of the 
government monopoly of education has not brought about the expected results. In fact, 
the effect of unrestricted choice in Chile has not improved average educational outcomes 
and it has, instead, lead to increased sorting of students (Hsieh & Urquiola, 2006). 
Cristian Bellei (2005) reported that five out of ten studies on public-private achievement 
differential, concluded that subsidized schools score higher than public schools; however, 
four studies concluded that basically both kinds of schools produce basic similar results; 
and one study concluded that private subsidized schools score lower than public schools. 
The author concluded that the studies on the private school advantage are very sensitive 
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to the methodological decisions made by researchers. The research evidence from the 
only country with full free market of education, does not provide a definitive answer 
about whether private schools are more effective than public schools.  
So far, the comparison between the achievement of public and private school 
students reviewed in this section has been limited to schools located within the same 
country. It would be interesting to compare the performance of private and public school 
students across countries and see if there is any consistent trend of private school students 
outperforming their public counterparts, even if it is only considering raw achievement. 
To this purpose, I used the results in mathematics from the latest PISA report (OECD, 
2013). I compared the performance of student in the top and lowest quartile of the PISA 
socioeconomic status across different countries. Under several assumptions (that all 
students in the top SES quartile attend private schools, all students in the lowest quartiles 
attend public schools, and that there are no marked differences in the public and private 
educational market across countries), I identified differences in student achievement in 
mathematics in private vs. public schools between Mexico and other countries. Mexican 
students in the top SES quartile (presumably all attending private schools) have an 
average achievement in math considerably below those students in the lowest SES 
quartile (presumably all attending public schools) of several countries, such as China, 
Korea, Canada, Estonia, Ireland, Vietnam, and Poland, among others. This means that 
even if there is a private school advantage in Mexico, students in Mexican private schools 
do not outperform students attending public schools in other countries. This information 
only tells us that the endeavor of studying whether there is a private school advantage, 
has to be limited to a particular social context to actually have any public policy meaning. 
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1.3 The Determinants of Private School Advantage 
In any given context, finding out whether there is indeed a private-public 
achievement differential is just half of the story.  For policy purposes, we also need to 
understand what are the determinants of any private school achievement advantage, 
where it exists (Jimenez et al., 1991). If researchers cannot determine which variables 
explain a private school advantage, policy makers cannot shape public policy to moderate 
the differences, and important lessons and opportunities for the educational system will 
be lost.  
Finding out the determinants of school performance had been an academic 
endeavor that has lasted almost five decades. Ever since the publication in the US of the 
Coleman Report (Coleman & al, 1966), there has been a big wave of research devoted to 
understanding the inputs and factors associated to student achievement in the school. 
However, studies differ in terms of the actual factors that explain achievement. Most of 
these studies fall under the category of “educational production function”. Since the 
earlier publications, the key objective of educational production function studies is to try 
to identify the combination of inputs that produces the maximum achievable educational 
output in the schools (Hanushek, 1979). However, very often researchers chose the inputs 
they include in their studies based on the availability of data, which usually comes from 
secondary sources, not guided by educational theory.  
Despite all research in the last decades, there is no final agreement as to what are 
the set of inputs that produce better school outcomes. In fact, earlier reviews of the 
available educational production function analyses showed that there is no systematic 
relationship between school inputs and student achievement (Hanushek, 1986). Even 
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resources that have been traditionally associated to student performance, such as 
promoting teacher training, improving physical facilities or reducing class size, appear to 
be ineffectively used at school, or, at least, inferior than other policies that concentrate on 
altering the incentives within schools (Hanushek, 2003). 
The longstanding perception of school resources as the answer for school quality 
seems to be supported by the US educational system data. Between 1960 and 2000, most 
measures of school inputs rose generously as product of systematic policy changes: pupil-
teacher ratio fell by slightly less than 40%, the proportion of teachers with a graduate 
degree increased by more than 100%, and teacher experience grew constantly. Despite all 
these changes in the makeup of schools, the performance of students in mathematics and 
reading in 1999 was only modestly higher than it was in 1970 (Hanushek, 2003).  
More recent studies using meta-analytic techniques compiling the results of 
hundreds of studies seem to differ with respect to the value of inputs in student outcomes 
found in earlier summaries of the research. Greenwald, Hedges, and Laine (1996) found 
that resources, such as per pupil expenditure, smaller class size, and teacher education, 
have a positive effect on student outcomes, and that these effects are large enough to be 
important for education policy. Hanushek (1996), on the other hand, criticizing the 
statistical methods and their selection of studies, reiterates that schools use resources 
inefficiently, making it very difficult to pinpoint resources that systematically makes a 
significant difference in student achievement.  
In a different perspective, it can be argued that student performance on 
standardized tests might not be the most appropriate measure of school performance. 
Card and Kruguer (1992) argue that looking at labor market outcomes, such as earnings, 
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might be a more realistic way to evaluate the effectiveness of school. Using differences in 
school inputs for blacks and whites in the eighteen segregated states from 1915 to 1966, 
they found that changes in school quality can explain between 50 to 80 percent of the 
increase in rate of returns to education for blacks workers born between 1940 and 1949.  
It is clear that we still have much to learn about what makes school better and 
how can we measure that improvement. 
 
1.3.1 International perspective and focus of this research 
The international literature is far from conclusive on issues of school inputs. For 
some authors, there are important similarities between research findings about the 
effectiveness of school resources in the developed world and research findings in 
developing countries. For example, Hanushek (1995) surveyed more than 100 studies in 
the developing world and concluded that, like in the US, the relationships between 
educational inputs and achievement shows that countries pursue very inefficient policies 
and that inputs have very weak effects on educational outcomes. However, a closer look 
at this study reveals that the estimated effects of many inputs in the studies covered in the 
analysis appears positive and statistically significant more often that one would expect it 
there were no relationship at all between resources and school outcomes. Physical and 
pedagogical inputs that do not bear much weight on student achievement in the 
industrialized world, seem to be of some importance in the developing world (Glewwe, 
Grosh, Jacoby, & Lockheed, 1995). It is very likely that school resources have a 
differentiated effect in early stages of economic development. In fact, some authors even 
argue that the poorer the country in economic terms, the more powerful the school effect 
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affected by its resources seems to be.  The country’s economic situation seems to make 
an important difference in the way school inputs affect educational outputs (Heyneman & 
Loxley, 1983; Lockheed & Hanushek, 1988).  
Nonetheless, before taking too far positive or negative results about the 
relationship between inputs and school quality, it is important to keep in mind that 
international studies are conducted in such diverse settings that it is unwise to extrapolate 
results found in one country in one particular setting to all countries and settings. The 
differences of school organizations, institutional arrangement, and labor markets make it 
very difficult to obtain results applicable to all Latin America.  
In my research, I am dealing with poor students attending private schools in 
Mexico, a setting that has been neglected by the literature. I believe that studies that try to 
explain the private school advantage by looking at school inputs in schools in general 
(without focus in any particular population) might not be able to explain the achievement 
differential of poor students in private and urban public schools in Mexico. 
Despite all variables considered in US and international studies, there are some 
consistent types of inputs used across the literature of school production function 
(Hanushek, 1995). I am drawing from that literature to choose the four types of school 
factors that have been hypothesized to explain a public-private achievement differential 
among students in the international literature, and that are the focus of this study:  (a) 
school physical resources; (b) school management; (c) teacher quality; and (d) teaching 
practices and classroom organization. For this dissertation, I have selected the four 
educational factors that have been the target of different educational programs and policy 
in Mexico in the last two decades (Álvarez, García Moreno, & Patrinos, 2007; Bracho, 
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2000; Fernández, 2003; Muñoz-Izquierdo & Ahuja, 2000; Reimers, 2006; Schmelkes, 
2000; Treviño & Treviño, 2004). There is however one important factor that has been 
present in the educational production function literature in the US since the very 
beginning, peer group effects. The importance of peer group composition was highlighted 
in the Coleman Report (Coleman & al, 1966). Coleman and his colleagues found in their 
research that if children of poor background, especially minority children, were inserted 
into schools with students with a better average background, their academic achievement 
would be higher.  These four factors are all susceptible to modification by policy and are, 
therefore, within the scope of change of politicians and policy makers. I discuss these 
factors briefly, below. 
There is overwhelming evidence that school facilities have an influence on 
educational achievement across developing countries (Hanushek, 1995). Since most 
private schools charge tuition fees and have considerable discretion in the allocation of 
their resources, they may be able to purchase additional physical and educational 
resources, such as books and computers, to enhance the academic performance of their 
students. Researchers have shown that school physical characteristics and equipment are 
important determinants of student performance in Latin America (Cox & Jimenez, 1990; 
Fernández, 2003; Fuller & Clarke, 1994; Heyneman & Loxley, 1983; Jimenez et al., 
1991; Treviño & Treviño, 2004). Physical resources have been present as an important 
factor in educational research since the Coleman Report (Coleman & al, 1966) and the 
first analyses on the quality of school conducted afterwards (Summers & Wolfe, 1977). 
In addition to physical resources, non-material inputs, such as teaching practices 
and school management, are very important to school quality. As I pointed out earlier, 
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research tends to show that simply increasing the level of resources does not seem to 
bring positive student educational outputs. Non-material inputs convey the way physical 
resources are administered, and represent in general the way the education process is 
organized (Fuller, 1986). How the schools are managed and led seems to be of much 
importance for school quality (Fuller, 1986). The way schools are structured and 
organized form the institutional arrangement that defines the milieu where education 
takes place. School management has the potential to affect everything that happens at the 
level of the school. It encompasses issues as different as the way teachers are evaluated, 
the way the principal promotes collaboration among teachers, or the way they administer 
their school resources.  
With respect to the role of teachers, teacher quality and teaching quality are two 
important factors. Measuring directly teacher quality has proven to be a difficult 
endeavor. Usually, researchers include “teacher education” and “teacher training” as 
proxies of teacher quality in production function analysis. In the US, these two proxies of 
teacher quality are rarely related to student performance (Hanushek, 2003). However, 
“teacher education” and “teacher training” in the developing world seem more relevant 
than what appears in the US (Fuller, 1986; Fuller & Clarke, 1994; Hanushek, 1995).  
Teacher quality seems to be one of the most important real resources of the 
classroom in private schools (Greenwald, Hedges, & Laine, 1996). Since private schools 
do not usually exist under the same pressures from teacher unions and regulations that 
public schools experience, scholars have hypothesized that they have more discretion and 
resources to hire better-prepared and experienced teachers, which then ultimately impacts 
the achievement of their students. In Latin America, high levels of teacher education, 
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teacher training, and teacher experience, have proven to be very frequently positively 
associated with the achievement advantage of students in private schools in the 
Dominican Republic (Jimenez et al., 1991), Mexico (Treviño & Treviño, 2004), 
Colombia (Cox & Jimenez, 1990) and other countries (Glewwe et al., 1995).  
In addition to the education and training of teachers, it is important to pay 
attention to what actually happens inside school classrooms. Hanushek suggests that 
inputs can be classified into two different groups: macro organizational and process 
characteristics, and what can be considered as micro factors (Hanushek, 1979). The first 
group comprises factors such as class organization and curriculum. By definition these 
inputs are relatively easy to identify and are, to a larger extent, reproducible. The micro 
factors, on the other hand, depend upon the personal skills of the teachers and other 
individual characteristics and usually take place at the level of the classroom. To this 
category belong factors such as classroom management and teacher’s communication 
skills. Changes in these factors are harder to implement and ultimately depend upon 
personal actions. Resources do not operate in a vacuum. It is clear that inputs effects are 
conditioned on the rules and practices of the classroom (Fuller & Clarke, 1994). The way 
teaching-learning relationship is constructed inside the classroom is, theoretically, one of 
the most important factors in student achievement (Fuller & Clarke, 1994). Yet, because 
of the scarcity of data, very few educational studies in Latin America include these 
“micro” factors in educational production functions.  
The few studies that do include teaching practices as an explanatory factor of 
student achievement tend to show positive significant results. The length of instruction, 
for example, is very important to student performance. Research in the US shows that the 
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time allocated to learning is positively associated to reading and mathematics test scores, 
especially for young children (Brown & Saks, 1986). In the US and Japan, teachers’ 
management of class time (as opposed to only amount of time allocated) is positively 
associated to higher student’s achievement tests (Schaub & Baker, 1991). In the 
developing world, Heyneman and Loxley (1983) found that hours per work week, hours 
per day school is open, and number of hours per day in school have a positive statistically 
significant influence in student achievement in Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, and Mexico. 
Research in Colombia found that the number of classes offered per year is associated to 
student achievement in primary schools. In fact, research has shown that private 
secondary schools in several developing countries tend to have more school days than 
public schools (Fuller & Clarke, 1994).  
Along the same lines, the assignment of homework by teachers also bears weight 
on student performance, as well as the level of teacher expectations for higher pupil 
achievement (Treviño, 2004). In Jamaican primary schools, Glewwe and his colleagues 
(1995) found that pedagogical process are more often related to student achievement in 
mathematics and reading than physical and pedagogical input variables.  
One of the main composite financial indicators of school resources, frequently 
measured in Latin America, is the student-teacher ratio. However, student-teacher ratio 
can also be a proxy for teacher-student contact time (Glewwe et al., 1995). In that sense, 
it can be considered one of the “micro factors” that set the dynamics of the classroom. 
Angrist and Lavy have shown that in other developed countries such as Israel, class size 
matters (Angrist & Lavy, 1999). Taking advantage of a rule established by rabbinic 
scholar Maimonides in the twelfth century, which limited the class size to 40, the authors 
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used a regression discontinuity design to the class-size issue, using the Maimonides rule 
as an instrument. They found that reducing class size causes significant increase in 
reading and math test scores in fourth and fifth grade students. A randomized experiment 
at large scale conducted in the state of Tennessee –the only one of this kind ever 
conducted in the US- showed that students in smaller classes tend to do better in 
standardized tests (Finn & Achilles, 1990). In a study aimed at explaining the black-white 
earning gap between 1960 and 1980, Card and Kruger found that the differential in pupil-
teacher ratio between the classes that whites and blacks attended between 1915 and 1966 
was associated to a larger black-white wage gap. In Latin America student-teacher ratio is 
often found to be a statistically significant mediator of the private school advantage (Cox 
& Jimenez, 1990; Jimenez et al., 1991; Treviño & Treviño, 2004).  
Based on the evidence reviewed in this section, I plan to use these four factors to 
try to explain the private-public advantage. 
 
2. Research Questions 
I am investigating whether there is a private school advantage in Mexico, 
particularly among poor students. As suggested above, I am also examining the extent to 
which any private school advantage stems from differences in the quality of the schools.  
My specific research questions are as follows:  
1. Are private schools more effective than public school in enhancing the 
achievement in Mathematics in primary education in Mexico? 
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2.  Does any private-school advantage stem from the higher levels of physical 
resources, the better school management, the enhanced teacher quality, and the better 
teaching practices and classroom organization that characterize private schools? 
 
3. Data  
I am using the second implementation of the Exámenes de Calidad y Logro 
Educativo (EXCALE06-2009), a testing exercise conducted in Mexico by the National 
Institute for Educational Evaluation (INEE) in June of 2009. EXCALE administered tests 
of Spanish, Mathematics, Civic Education and Natural Sciences to a representative 
national sample of students in sixth grade (the last grade in primary school). I am using 
the Mathematics test and all the associated questionnaires. The test was aligned to the 
national curriculum for each grade, and was constructed from items calibrated using Item 
Response Theory (INEE, 2006).  The Mathematics test is scored and normalized so it has 
a mean of 500 points and a standard deviation of 100 points. EXCALE also administered 
surveys to all students in the sample, and to their teachers and school principals. This 
dataset is suitable for my research because it not only contains data on student 
achievement and school choice but also rich information on the student’s family and 
educational background; on teacher education and experience; and on school-level 
physical resources. It also allows me to determine whether the family has received an 
Oportunidades scholarship. 
EXCALE06-2009 comprises 4 databases: one database with the results of the 
students in Math, and three databases of associated information, one for each of the 
respondents of each of the three questionnaires (students, school teachers, and school 
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principals). After a series of merges and variable preparations, I constructed a single 
database containing student data, with their corresponding results on the standardized 
Math test, their responses to their personal questionnaire, and the answer to the 
questionnaires administered to their class teacher and to their school principal. 
 
3.1 Sample 
I am comparing the academic performance of the population of students from 
low-income families who attended either a public or a private school. I located a sample 
from this low-income population within the EXCALE dataset by using information on 
whether students were awarded an Oportunidades scholarship (a yes-answer to the 
AP035 question in the student questionnaire). In the academic year 2008-2009, about 2.5 
million children received an Oportunidades scholarship to attend either a public or a 
private school; that is roughly 18% of the total enrolment of primary education level for 
that academic year.  Because of the limited supply of private schools in rural areas in 
Mexico, all private schools in the EXCALE database are in urban areas. In fact, it seems 
that there is barely a private school market for the poor in rural area, despite the fact that 
in 2009 64% of the population living in rural areas were considered poor. In urban areas, 
on the other hand, in 2009, 40.4 percent of the population was living under the official 
line of poverty: 33.7% in poverty and 6.7% in extreme poverty (the figures for rural areas 
are 38% for poverty and 26.5% of extreme poverty). Therefore, in creating my analytic 
sample, I included only students from urban public schools, for comparability.  In this 
survey and testing exercise, there are 70,888 students in the 6th grade distributed among 
4,299 schools in the sample. EXCALE administered tests for the subject matters of 
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Spanish, Mathematics, Civic Education, and Natural Sciences. After implementing these 
constraints, my final sample consists of a total of 3,311 students in 1,524 schools. The 
sample is distributed as follows: 330 students with Oportunidades scholarships 
distributed in 226 private schools, and 2,981 students with Oportunidades in 1,298 urban 
public schools.  
Oportunidades is the flagship social development program of the Mexican 
government. It is a conditional transfer program; it offers an economic stipend and 
scholarships in exchange of certain behaviors expected from the beneficiaries, such as 
attending school, having regular medical check-ups, among others. Families that are 
covered by the program, who are living under the official poverty line, receive an 
economic scholarship depending on the age of their children, their educational level, and 
their gender. 
It is very likely that the scholarship awarded to parents through Oportunidades is 
high enough to pay for private education There is no general database comprising the 
tuition and fees that private schools charge, but according to information from Mexican 
household survey, where parents report how much they spend on tuition and fees for the 
private education of their children according to their economic level, poor families invest 
in private tuition and fees in amounts even below of Oportunidades scholarships (G. 
Treviño, 2005). 
Children in the sample, students who are beneficiaries of Oportunidades, are 
different themselves from the rest of the population. Table 2 compares the students in the 
sample with the rest of the universe from EXCALE06-2009.  
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Table 2: Comparison of student achievement in Mathematics between 
students included in the sample (poor students that belong to 
Oportunidades program) and the universe of students in Excale. 
  Urban Public Schools   Private School 
  N Mean s.d.   N Mean s.d. 
Universe 8331 520 93 
 
2087 591 99 
Sample 2981 493 89 
 
330 572 103 
Total 11312 513 92   2417 589 100 
 
 Student in the general population outperform their poor peers in the sample in 
both urban public schools and in private schools. In urban public school students in the 
general population outperform their peers in the sample by a difference of 27 points, a 
little more than one quarter of a standard deviation in mathematics test. In private schools 
that difference is of 19 points only. It is interesting to see how poor students attending 
private schools perform closer to other non-poor children attending private schools. This 
could be because there is more similarity between the poor and non-poor students 
attending private schools, or it could be because private schools tend to close the 
achievement gap between poor and non-poor students. I expect that this research can shed 
some light into this topic and have a better understanding of Oportunidades children. 
 The EXCALE06-2009 was construed in a way that is representative at the 
national level. Students in the sample and in the entire population are scattered across all 
country. Mexico is marked by economic and educational inequalities. All states in the 
country can be divided into four regions, depending of the percentage of the population 
within the state living under the line of poverty (CONEVAL, 2010). Table 3 conveys the 
distribution of the EXCALE data and the dissertation sample, broken down by poverty 
region.  
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Table 3: Distribution of students included in the sample (poor students that belong 
to Oportunidades program) versus the universe of students in Excale, broken down 
by poverty region. 
  Poor (Sample)   Non-Poor (Universe) 
 
Urban Public 
 
Private 
 
Urban Public 
 
Private 
Poverty Regions N %   N %   N %   N % 
Region 1 
Between 21% and 34.7% poor 719 24% 
 
101 31% 
 
2691 32% 
 
2546 30% 
Region 2 
Between 34.8% and 42.9% poor  698 23% 
 
106 32% 
 
2395 29% 
 
2388 28% 
Region 3 
Between 43% and 54.7% poor  779 26% 
 
85 26% 
 
1732 21% 
 
2440 29% 
Region 4 
Between 54.8% and 78.5% 785 26% 
 
38 12% 
 
1513 18% 
 
1106 13% 
Total 2981 100%   330 100%   8331 100%   8480 100% 
 
 Poor students attending public schools (included in the sample) are almost equally 
distributed across poverty regions. However, there is a larger concentration of poor 
students attending private schools (63%), living in the least poor regions, Region 1 and 2. 
This is consistent to what we know about private schools, which had developed mainly in 
the better-off states of the country.  This difference seems to be less accentuated with 
respect to non-oportunidades children. There are 58% of them attending schools in 
Regions 1 and 2 versus 42% attending schools in Regions 3 and 4. One possible 
explanation for this discrepancy (more poor children attending private schools in the least 
poor regions than in the poorest regions) is that it might be the case that private schools in 
better-off states might tend to be more inclusive than those located in poorer (and perhaps 
more elitist) states, and therefore, more willing to enroll (through scholarships perhaps) 
poor children. 
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4. Is There a Private School Advantage in Mathematics? 
This part of the dissertation is devoted to answer my first research question. It is 
divided in five sections. In the first part (4.1), I describe the analytical methodology used 
to assess whether there is a private school advantage among poor students in Mexico. I 
begin this part by presenting a brief review of the literature on experimental design and 
bias correction (4.1.1), and continue with the discussion of the identification strategy 
(4.1.2), which uses the propensity score matching methodology to estimate the private 
school effect in mathematics. In the second part (4.2), I present the descriptive statistics 
depicting the basic feature of student performance in the sample and their personal and 
family characteristics. In the third part (4.3), I present the empirical results, and in the 
fourth section (4.4) I introduce three types of sensitivity analyses to offer robustness 
checks to the findings presented in the third part. In the last section (4.5) I summarize the 
answer to the first research question.  
 
4.1 Analytical Methodology  
4.1.1 The Problem Of Selection Bias: a literature review 
From a methodological standpoint, experimental research provides the ideal 
design for assessing the impact of a private school education on student achievement, as 
compared to that provided by the public school system. In an experiment, children are 
assigned randomly to private and public schools by an exogenous agent, say the 
researcher.  Then, student achievement is measured and compared across types of 
schools. Because of the random assignment of students to schools, all unobserved causes 
of student achievement – perhaps inequities between the systems in important 
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characteristics of the student and the family (such as student ability and parental 
education) are averaged across sectors and obtained estimates of the private school 
advantage are unbiased and can be interpreted causally.    
However, such experiments are usually neither feasible nor ethically desirable. 
Parents are (and should be) involved in important decisions concerning their children’s 
education, and this makes the choice of a school in the public or private sector 
endogenous, potentially correlated with critical parental and student characteristics, such 
as socioeconomic status, parental and student motivation, and student ability. In other 
words, in a non-experimental setting, families sort their children into schools, leading to 
selection bias in estimates of the private school advantage obtained from observational 
data. 
The endogenous nature of school choice challenges the identification of the effect 
of educational sector on student achievement. If student selection into a public or a 
private school is based implicitly on non-school variables, such as critical student and 
family characteristics, and these variables are correlated with student achievement, then 
traditional estimates of the private school advantage (e.g., an observed difference in 
student achievement averages between sectors) will be biased. For example, if parents 
with a better educational background tend to send their children to private school, instead 
of public, then it is likely that the observed effect of private school on the achievement of 
their children will be confounded with any effects that their own education brings to bear 
on their children’s achievement, resulting in selection bias. 
In the absence of controlled experiments, researchers have tried to resolve the 
selection bias induced by endogenous school choice by introducing control predictors 
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into their regression models to account for variation in these important non-school 
characteristics. If all the characteristics that drive school choice and student achievement 
were explicitly included in the statistical model, then bias would be eliminated. However, 
even when a wide variety of controls, such as parental education, family income, and 
student ability, are introduced, there may still arguably be other important characteristics 
that are correlated with both student achievement and school choice that remain 
unobserved and are omitted from the model, such as parental motivation, which then 
results in continued bias.   
In the last two decades, the selection bias problem has been addressed in more 
efficient ways, using two-step statistical corrections (Heckman, 1979) or instrumental 
variable estimation (Angrist, Imbens, & Rubin, 1996)4.  In these approaches, the selection 
process itself – here the parents’ choice of the public or private sector for their child’s 
school -- is modeled as a function of predictors hypothesized to describe the process, in a 
“first-stage”.  Then a “second stage” model describing the link between the ultimate 
outcome – student achievement – and school choice is fitted, while simultaneously being 
corrected for the consequences of the first-stage. In this approach, there must be at least 
one predictor that predicts selection, but does not impact student achievement directly. 
This predictor, which forms the basis of an “exclusion restriction”, is therefore supposed 
to be correlated with school choice but not correlated with student achievement.  The key 
to making the bias-correction successful is finding a suitable predictor that satisfies the 
exclusion restriction.  
                                                
4 For a review of selection bias in public-private school comparisons, see Murnane (1984; 1985). 
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Researchers investigating the public-private student achievement differential in 
Latin America have applied these selection bias corrections with different levels of 
success (Somers et al., 2001). Some authors have not dealt explicitly with selection bias 
beyond the point of controlling for student background variables and peer group effects in 
their regression models (Fernández, 2003; Treviño & Treviño, 2004). Other researchers 
have applied the Heckman bias correction, or some variation of it, although their choices 
of predictors to satisfy the exclusion restrictions have differed. Some researchers have 
used the socioeconomic characteristics of the students’ families as predictors of private 
school enrollment in the first stage equation (Cox & Jimenez, 1990), others have used 
levels of private school tuition and fees, (Jimenez et al., 1991), or the supply of private 
schools, as measured by the number of schools per square kilometer in the student’s 
family neighborhood (McEwan, 2001).  In this dissertation, I am employing a more 
robust and partially non-parametric approach to selectivity bias correction using 
propensity score-matching methodology (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983).  
 
4.1.2 Identification Strategy: Propensity Score Matching 
In order to make unbiased claims about the causal impact of private versus public 
schools on student achievement, it is necessary to successfully correct for bias arising 
from the self-sorting of students into type of schools. To achieve this, I am using 
propensity score-matching (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985a, 
1985b), in which I use logistic regression analysis to estimate each student’s predicted 
probability of private school enrolment, from their values of observed student and family 
characteristics that arguably affect their school choice (Dehejia & Wahba, 2002).  Using 
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these estimated propensity scores - the conditional treatment probability of private school 
entry-- I then match each treated observation (each poor student attending private school), 
with a control observation (a poor student attending an urban public school) with the 
closest propensity score within the whole distribution of propensity scores. In other 
words, I am pairing students with similar probabilities to be in a private school.  In order 
to do this, I am using a matching estimation called nearest neighbor. This methodology 
was used with replacement, meaning that each control observation can be matched with 
more than one treatment observation5 
This technique ensures that all parameters are estimated – and, hence, all 
comparisons made –within groups of students with similar risks of self-selection into 
private schools, eliminating in this way the observed bias.  
 Once the matching has been made through nearest neighborhood technique, the 
difference between student performance in private and public schools can be obtained by 
subtracting the difference in achievement between matched private and urban public 
school students and averaging across the sample.   
In this research, SES and other individual-level variables will be used as a way to 
model selection into private schools; a necessary step towards identifying the effect of 
private school achievement and the elements that explain it. The characteristics of these 
variables are going to be explained in the next section. 
 
 
 
                                                
5 For more reference on the general characteristics of propensity score matching, see (Caliendo & 
Kopeinig, 2005; Dehejia & Wahba, 2002; Guo & Fraser, 2010; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985b) 
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4.2 Measures and Descriptive Statistics 
4.2.1 Measures 
Selection of variables that are going to be used in the logistic model use to predict 
selection into private school is a very important task in the propensity score methodology. 
According to the literature (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2005; Heckman, LaLonde, & Smith, 
1999; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985b; Sianesi, 2004; Smith & 
Todd, 2005), there are five characteristics that the variables included in the logistic model 
must have. First, the selection of variable should be based on the knowledge of previous 
specialized literature and knowledge of the institutional setting (Sianesi, 2004; Smith & 
Todd, 2005), in this case, self-selection into private school in developing countries. 
Second, the variables must be independent of treatment conditional on the propensity 
score, a characteristic known as conditional independence assumption, or CIA (Caliendo 
& Kopeinig, 2005; Sianesi, 2004). Ideally, variables that influence simultaneously the 
participation decision (in this case, selection into private school) and the outcome 
variable (achievement in mathematics) should be included in the model. Third, only 
variables that are unaffected by participation should be included in the model. To ensure 
this, only variables that are measured before participation should go into the model 
(Heckman et al., 1999). And fourth, it is ideal that data from participants and non-
participants (public and private school students in this case) come from their same source 
(Heckman et al., 1999).  
The variables selected to be part in the model meet these five characteristics. They 
all are subject-level variables, which come from the same source, the second 
implementation of the Exámenes de Calidad y Logro Educativo (EXCALE06-2009). The 
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selection of the variables was based in the analysis of the literature of private school 
education in Mexico and other developing countries, which I reviewed in Section 1 of 
this dissertation. Also, as will be discussed in the next section, the conditional 
independence assumption holds after matching. Additionally, all the variables affect both 
the probability of getting into a private school and academic achievement. On the other 
hand, none of the variables that are going to be used in the logistic model are affected by 
enrollment in private education and the values of most of the variable either are obtained 
prior to enrollment into private or public education or are completely independent of it.  
In Table A1, in the Appendix, I provide a complete list of variables that are 
included in my analyses, along with a description of each one of them.  I review them 
briefly below.  
My outcome variable is MATH, which measures student performance on an IRT-
scaled test administered by the INEE.  Scores range from 200 to 800, with higher scores 
representing higher student achievement.  The standard deviation is 100. I will use a 
dummy predictor, PRIVATE, to indicate whether the student attends a private or public 
school.  
Based on the relevant literature reviewed in Section 1, I am using several 
predictors to describe student selection into private or public schools. These include 
predictors measuring individual student characteristics such as gender and age. I am also 
including a dichotomous variable indicating whether the student received preschool 
education, and a vector of dummy variables recording the language spoken at home.  
I am also including seven predictors that describe family socioeconomic status. I 
am measuring parental education with two sets of vectors of dummy variables, one for 
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maternal education and another one for paternal education, measuring educational 
achievement from “no education at all” to “graduate education”.   
In order to measure the availability of educational resources at home, I included a 
vector of six dummy variables indicating the number of books available at home, ranging 
from zero to “200 or more”. I also created four dummy variables indicating the kind of 
health service the family has access to, including the access to private health services. 
Finally, I created three dummy variables indicating the availability of computer, 
car and telephone at home as proxies of the level of family’s material wellbeing and 
socioeconomic status.  
 
4.2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
4.2.2.1 Student Performance 
There seems to be important differences between the achievement of poor 
students in urban public and private schools. Poor students in private school perform 
considerably better in mathematics than poor students in public schools. The average 
difference is 79 test points, which represent almost 0.8 of one standard deviation unit.  
Gross differences are not enough to sustain that students perform better in private 
schools. Traditional estimates of the private school advantage (for example, analysis of 
observed difference in student achievement averages between sectors, like the one I just 
described) are usually biased. Nonetheless, one might think, considering that all students 
included in this sample in both, private and public schools are officially poor (official 
beneficiaries of Oportunidades scholarships), that one reasonable approach to prove that 
there is a private school advantage is to simply compare the average performance in each 
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subject matter between poor students in both types of schools. According to the literature 
review, SES seems to be one of the best proxies of the quality of educational opportunity 
that students have at home, and that appears to be related to both, selection into private 
school and achievement. Therefore, hypothetically, finding statistically significant 
difference between students in both types of school would answer my first research 
question.  
In fact, the results of a t-test performed to test the null hypothesis that states that 
there is no difference between the average performance of poor students in public and 
private schools in Mathematics, show that the difference of 0.79 sd between the 
performance of poor students in these two types of schools are statistically significant 
(t=15.13, p< 0.000).  
However, the fact that students in both types of school are poor does not 
necessarily mean that their school performance can be compared only based in 
observational data. In a non-experimental setting, families sort their children into schools, 
leading to selection bias in estimates of the private school advantage obtained from 
observational data. There might be factors affecting family decision to send their children 
to private school that are equally related to student performance in school. Therefore, it is 
likely that the observed effect of private school on the achievement of their children will 
be confounded with variables involved in the mechanism of school selection.  
 
4.2.2.2 Family and Student Characteristics 
In addition to academic achievement, poor students in public and private schools 
seem to have some similarities and some differences in terms of their personal and family 
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characteristics. Mean value for student characteristics and socioeconomic status variables 
for students in public and private schools are shown in Table 4. 
Students in private and public schools are on average very similar in terms of their 
age and the language spoken at their home. The average age in public school is 12.4 years 
versus 12.15 in private school, very close to the official expected age for sixth graders in 
Mexico, which is 12 years. Spanish is the language predominantly spoken at home: 95% 
of the students speak it at home in public schools versus 97% of the students in private 
schools.  
In terms of gender composition, public and private schools are practically equal. 
In both types of schools, female students account for 48% of the sixth grade student 
body. On average, parents are equally inclined to send male or female children to private 
schools. 
With respect to SES, private school students have higher SES background than 
public school students. Parents of private school students have on average more education 
than parents from students in public schools. For example, the vast majority of mothers 
(60%) in private schools have high school or college education, whereas only 20% 
percent of mothers in public schools have completed either high school or college. A 
similar patter can be observed with respect to the education of fathers, although in this 
case the achievement gap between those parents in private schools achieving either high 
school or college and those parents in public schools with the same level of education is 
33 percentage points, slightly smaller than the gap found among mothers. 
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Table 4: Mean values and standard deviation for student characteristics and 
socioeconomic status of poor children in public and private schools (N=3,311). 
          
Variables Public Private 
  Mean sd Mean sd 
Female 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.50 
Age in years 12.45 0.73 12.15 0.48 
Preschool 0.89 0.32 0.99 0.11 
     Language spoken at home 
    Spanish 0.95 0.21 0.97 0.16 
Indigenous 0.03 0.16 0.01 0.08 
Other language 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14 
     Mother’s Education 
    No formal education 0.07 0.26 0.01 0.08 
Primary school 0.33 0.47 0.06 0.25 
Secondary school 0.38 0.49 0.17 0.37 
High school 0.14 0.35 0.22 0.42 
College 0.06 0.23 0.38 0.49 
Graduate school 0.02 0.14 0.16 0.37 
     Father’s Education 
    No Formal education 0.06 0.25 0.02 0.14 
Primary school 0.30 0.46 0.06 0.24 
Secondary school 0.37 0.48 0.14 0.35 
High school 0.17 0.37 0.21 0.41 
College 0.07 0.25 0.36 0.48 
Graduate school 0.03 0.17 0.21 0.41 
     Availability of Books at Home 
    No books available at home 0.20 0.40 0.03 0.16 
Around 10 books 0.31 0.46 0.16 0.37 
Around 25 Books 0.19 0.39 0.16 0.37 
Around 50 books 0.15 0.36 0.19 0.40 
Around 100 books 0.09 0.28 0.25 0.43 
Around 200 books 0.07 0.25 0.20 0.40 
     Health Services Available to the Family 
    Family has no access to medical services 0.04 0.20 0.02 0.15 
Family goes to popular or public clinic, or to a pharmacy 0.65 0.48 0.24 0.43 
Family goes to IMSS, ISSSTE or similar institution 0.27 0.44 0.43 0.50 
Family goes to private clinics and private health services 0.04 0.19 0.30 0.46 
     Computer at home 0.31 0.46 0.85 0.36 
Car at home 0.53 0.50 0.90 0.31 
Telephone at home 0.54 0.50 0.89 0.32 
 
The out-of-school educational opportunity of poor children in public and private 
schools are also very different. Almost all children with Oportunidades in private schools 
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have had a preschool education (99%), compared with only 89% of children in public 
schools. Considering the importance of preschool education in primary school 
performance, this difference in preschool attainment means that, on average, poor 
children in private schools tend to have a better level of school readiness for primary 
school education than poor children in public schools.  
Despite the fact that children included in this research, whether enrolled in public 
or private schools, are all poor in the sense that they are beneficiaries of the 
Oportunidades program, there still seem to be some important differences in terms of 
socioeconomic status and educational opportunities at home between the families of those 
students attending private schools and those attending urban public schools. Families 
with children in private schools have on average more books at home: 45% of them have 
between 100 and 200 books or more available to their children, whereas only 16% of 
families with children in public schools have this number of books at home. Also, 73% of 
families with children in private schools have access to good quality public or private 
health services, whereas only 31% of families with poor children in public schools have 
access to this kind of services. In addition to that, 85% of families with children in private 
schools have computers at home and 90% of them have cars, versus only 31% and 53% 
respectively for families with children in public schools.  
The difference in access to good quality health services, availability of goods, 
such as cars and computers at home, and parental education between families with 
children in public and private schools suggests that there are still some differences in 
terms of economic resources and extra school educational opportunities between families 
with children in different types of school, despite the fact that both types of families are 
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considered poor by Oportunidades program standards, and these differences suggest that 
the students attending private schools are relatively more advantaged. These existence of 
these differences suggest that a simple comparison of student’s gross achievement in 
public and private schools, even if it is with supposedly equally poor students, it is not 
appropriate, and that other techniques should be employed to remove, to the extent that is 
possible with the data available, any possible source of bias due to the endogeneity of 
school choice.  
 
4.3 Empirical Results 
In order to answer my first research question, I first fitted a logistic regression 
model to predict selection into private school in a first-stage model for students who 
tested in Mathematics in the Excale evaluation. As I explained in the previous section, I 
am only using pre-treatment single-level covariates to obtain the estimated probability of 
selection into private school. I use of the psmatch2 module in Stata to conduct this 
analysis6. Table 5 presents the results.  
The results rendered by the model show that there is no statistically significant 
effect of being female on predicting selection into private school, holding constant all 
other variables in the model. This is not surprising since there is no apparent difference in 
gender composition between treatment and control groups.  
 
                                                
6 E. Leuven and B. Sianesi. (2003) “PSMATCH2: Stata module to perform full Mahalanobis and 
propensity score matching, common support graphing, and covariate imbalance testing”. 
http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s432001.html. 
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Table 5: Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for the Prediction of 
Oportunidades Students’ Enrollment into Private School, for Mathematics test 
taker’s in the EXCALE06-2009, Controlling for Background Variables (N=2,954) 
Variable	   Coef.	   Std.	  Err.	   z	   P>z	   [95%	  Conf.	  Interval]	  
Female	   0.15	   0.16	   0.99	   0.32	   -­‐0.15	   0.46	  
Age	   -­‐0.49	   0.15	   -­‐3.25	   0.00	   -­‐0.78	   -­‐0.19	  
Preschool	   1.23	   0.55	   2.23	   0.03	   0.15	   2.31	  
Language	  Spoken	  at	  Home	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Indigenous	   -­‐0.75	   1.08	   -­‐0.70	   0.49	   -­‐2.86	   1.36	  
Other	   -­‐0.27	   0.50	   -­‐0.54	   0.59	   -­‐1.24	   0.70	  
Mother’s	  Education	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Primary	  School	   0.63	   0.78	   0.81	   0.42	   -­‐0.90	   2.16	  
Secondary	  School	   0.79	   0.77	   1.02	   0.31	   -­‐0.72	   2.30	  
High	  School	   1.24	   0.78	   1.59	   0.11	   -­‐0.28	   2.76	  
College	   2.03	   0.78	   2.60	   0.01	   0.50	   3.56	  
Graduate	  School	   1.99	   0.81	   2.46	   0.01	   0.40	   3.57	  
Father’s	  Education	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Primary	  School	   -­‐0.86	   0.54	   -­‐1.61	   0.11	   -­‐1.91	   0.19	  
Secondary	  School	   -­‐0.78	   0.51	   -­‐1.54	   0.12	   -­‐1.77	   0.21	  
High	  School	   -­‐0.32	   0.51	   -­‐0.62	   0.54	   -­‐1.33	   0.69	  
College	   0.35	   0.52	   0.67	   0.50	   -­‐0.67	   1.37	  
Graduate	  School	   0.43	   0.55	   0.79	   0.43	   -­‐0.64	   1.50	  
Books	  Available	  at	  Home	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Around	  10	  Books	   0.68	   0.41	   1.66	   0.10	   -­‐0.12	   1.49	  
Around	  25	  Books	   0.94	   0.42	   2.25	   0.02	   0.12	   1.75	  
Around	  50	  Books	   0.81	   0.42	   1.93	   0.05	   -­‐0.01	   1.62	  
Around	  100	  Books	   1.35	   0.42	   3.24	   0.00	   0.53	   2.17	  
200	  or	  more	  Books	   1.26	   0.43	   2.95	   0.00	   0.42	   2.09	  
Access	  to	  Health	  Services	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Access	  to	  Popular	  Clinic	  or	  Pharmacy	   -­‐0.46	   0.47	   -­‐0.98	   0.33	   -­‐1.38	   0.46	  
Access	  to	  IMSS,	  ISSSTE,	  or	  similar	  inst.	   -­‐0.13	   0.47	   -­‐0.27	   0.78	   -­‐1.05	   0.79	  
Access	  to	  Private	  Clinics	   1.10	   0.49	   2.24	   0.03	   0.14	   2.06	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Availability	  of	  Computer	  at	  Home	   0.92	   0.21	   4.43	   0.00	   0.51	   1.33	  
Availability	  of	  Car	  at	  Home	   0.61	   0.23	   2.68	   0.01	   0.17	   1.06	  
Availability	  of	  Telephone	  at	  Home	   0.53	   0.22	   2.44	   0.02	   0.10	   0.96	  
Constant	   -­‐0.47	   2.17	   -­‐0.22	   0.83	   -­‐4.72	   3.79	  
Log	  Likelihood	   -­‐597.86795	  
LR	  chi2	  (26)	   749.35	  
Prob	  >	  chi2	   0.0000	  
Pseudo	  R2	   0.3853	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On the other hand, having a positive preschool education have a statistically 
significant difference in selection into private school, which means that families with 
children with higher level of school reediness are more likely, on average, to attend 
private schools. Age has a statistically and negative significant effect. This probably 
means that children have more probabilities to get enrolled into private schools if they are 
younger than the official entering age for sixth grade. The logistic model shows that the 
language spoken at home does not seem to affect the decision of attending a private 
school. The indicator variables for home language are not statistically significant after 
holding constant all other variables in the model. 
With respect to parental education, higher levels of mother’s education seem to 
have, on average, a positive effect on the likelihood of enrolling children into private 
schools, especially when mothers have higher education and beyond. The same does not 
seem to apply to father’s education. Once the other variables are held constant in the 
model, the indicator variables for father education are not significant. 
 The level of educational resources available at home, measured by a dummy 
system indicating the number of books available at home, has a strong positive and 
statistically significant effect in the model. This probably means that parents who have 
more educational resources at home (and are probably more invested in the education of 
their children) tend to be more likely to enroll their children in private schools than 
families with less educational resources available at home.  
 The rest of the variables in the model, which indicate different levels of SES 
among families that are beneficiaries of the Oportunidades program, are statistically 
significant and have positive effects. This means, that even among families that are 
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considered poor, having a “higher” level of SES increases the chances, on average, of 
enrolling children into private schools.  
 Overall, the model is doing a good job predicting enrollment into private school, 
and the null hypothesis that states that all logistic regression coefficients are equal to zero 
at the same time can be rejected at the 1% significant level (LR chi2 = 749.35, Prob > 
chi2 = 0.0000). 
 Once the conditional predicted probabilities were estimated for each participant in 
the study (whether the student is in private or public schools) the matching was 
performed using the nearest-neighbor matching estimator. Results are presented in table 
6.  
Table 6: Differences in ATT in Mathematics between students with 
Oportunidades scholarship in Public and Private schools, using the nearest 
neighbor matching estimator (On support: 2,653 public students, 301 private 
students) 
Sample	   Private	  School	   Public	  School	   Difference	   S.E.	   T-­‐stat	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  Unmatched	   573.71	   494.34	   79.37	   5.47	   14.50	  
ATT	   573.71	   535.47	   38.24	   12.74	   3.00	  
 
The first row in the table shows the results for the unmatched samples of students, 
before the matching process is carried out. Here we see the result presented a bit earlier –
a difference of 79 points, or about 0.80 of a standard deviation. The second row of the 
table, label ATT7, provides the important comparison of the scores after the matching 
process.  The private school advantage is equal to 38.24 test points, or 38% of a standard 
deviation. It is clear that poor private school students outperformed, on average, their 
                                                
7 ATT (the average treatment effect for the treated) is the effect focus of this research. It conveys the effect 
in the population for whom private school is intended.  
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comparable public counterparts in Mathematics by almost half a standard deviation. The 
difference between the private school advantage reported in the unmatched sample and 
the private school advantage reported in the ATT is due to the effect of propensity score 
matching. The ATT shows the public-private school differential after the attempt to 
remove the selection bias. It is therefore a more reliable estimate of the difference of poor 
students performance in both types of schools. Even after the implementation of 
propensity score matching, the private school differential still remains substantial.   
 The matching procedure is only using the students in the treatment group (private 
schools) and the control group (public schools) whose propensity scores overlap. This 
overlapping region is called common support. Table 6 reports the number of students in 
public and private schools who are in common support.  
Before trusting the results, it is necessary to check for balance between the two 
groups formed by the nearest matching estimator. Table 7 shows a summary of balancing 
measures for that purpose.  
Table 7: Measures of Balance for after performance of nearest 
neighbor matching for the Identification of Differences in ATT in 
Mathematics between Students with Oportunidades scholarship in 
Public and Private schools. 
Sample	   Pseudo	  R2	   LR	  chi2	   p>chi2	   MeanBias	   MedBias	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  Raw	   0.379	   736.61	   0.000	   49.9	   47.5	  
Matched	   0.037	   30.44	   0.208	   6.5	   5.2	  
 
The first raw (labeled “Raw”) shows the balancing statistics for the unmatched 
sample, while the second raw (labeled “Matched”) shows the balancing statistics for the 
groups after the matching procedure. The LR chi2 has an associated null hypothesis that 
states that the values of all the variables in the model are jointly balanced between the 
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two groups. Before the matching procedure was implemented, the null hypothesis of LR 
chi2 for the “raw” sample was rejected (LR chi2 = 736.61, Prob. Chi2 = 0.000), meaning 
that the variables in the model were not balanced. After the matching was implemented, I 
cannot reject this null hypothesis (LR chi2 = 30.44, Prob. Chi2 = 0.208), which means 
that the variables in the model were correctly balanced. In addition to that, the Pseudo R2 
indicates how well the regressors included in the logistic model explain the participation 
probability. Once the matching is performed, there should not be any systematic 
differences in the distribution of explanatory variables between both groups, so the 
pseudo-R2 should be low (Sianesi, 2004). In this case, it is low, as it would be expected in 
the case of good match between the two groups. Also, Mean and Median Bias are both 
low too, confirming the good match between students in both groups.  
To further check that both groups are correctly matched based on their propensity 
values, I am comparing the mean values of all background variables included in the 
logistic model between the two groups. Table 8 presents this information along the results 
of t-test for equality of means and other measures of balance. This information further 
helps assess the quality of the matching obtained through the nearest neighbor estimator.  
The summary of t-test results shows that most variables are considered balanced 
between the groups of students in public and private schools after matching. For almost 
all variables I cannot reject the t-test associated null hypothesis that states that there is no 
statistically significant difference between the mean variable values for both private and 
public school students. The only exception is one of the variables of the “availability of 
book at home” dummy system (the variable measuring availability 200 or more books). 
However, the actual difference in the value of this variable does not seem to be very large 
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to be of concern. Besides, the other variables in the dummy system are well balanced 
between the two groups. 
 
Table 8: Summary of t-test results for personal-level variables and analysis of 
balance After Propensity Score Matching Estimation has been conducted for 
the Identification of ATT in Mathematics between Students with Oportunidades 
scholarship in Public and Private schools using nearest neighbor matching. 
	  	   Comparison	   Mean	   	  	   %reduct	   t-­‐test	  
Variable	   Matched	   Treated	   Control	   %bias	   bias	   t	   p>t	  
Female	   Unmatched	   0.49	   0.49	   0.4	  
	  
0.06	   0.95	  
 
Matched	   0.49	   0.45	   8.6	   -­‐2363.5	   1.06	   0.29	  
Age	   Unmatched	   12.16	   12.44	   -­‐45.3	  
	  
-­‐6.53	   0.00	  
 
Matched	   12.16	   12.10	   9.4	   79.3	   1.47	   0.14	  
Preschool	   Unmatched	   0.99	   0.89	   40.9	  
	  
5.31	   0.00	  
 
Matched	   0.99	   0.98	   1.4	   96.6	   0.34	   0.74	  
Language	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Indigenous	   Unmatched	   0.00	   0.02	   -­‐16.9	  
	  
-­‐2.21	   0.03	  
 
Matched	   0.00	   0.00	   3.0	   82.4	   1.00	   0.32	  
Other	   Unmatched	   0.02	   0.02	   2.5	  
	  
0.43	   0.67	  
 
Matched	   0.02	   0.03	   -­‐6.9	   -­‐172.7	   -­‐0.74	   0.46	  
Mother’s	  Education	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Primary	  School	   Unmatched	   0.07	   0.33	   -­‐71.1	  
	  
-­‐9.71	   0.00	  
 
Matched	   0.07	   0.09	   -­‐5.3	   92.6	   -­‐0.92	   0.36	  
Secondary	  School	   Unmatched	   0.16	   0.38	   -­‐50.8	  
	  
-­‐7.57	   0.00	  
 
Matched	   0.16	   0.14	   4.6	   90.9	   0.68	   0.49	  
High	  School	   Unmatched	   0.22	   0.14	   20.6	  
	  
3.64	   0.00	  
 
Matched	   0.22	   0.17	   12.2	   40.9	   1.44	   0.15	  
College	   Unmatched	   0.39	   0.06	   87.6	  
	  
20.59	   0.00	  
 
Matched	   0.39	   0.45	   -­‐15.7	   82.1	   -­‐1.49	   0.14	  
Graduate	  School	   Unmatched	   0.16	   0.02	   49.7	  
	  
12.67	   0.00	  
 
Matched	   0.16	   0.15	   3.6	   92.8	   0.34	   0.74	  
Father’s	  Education	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Primary	  School	   Unmatched	   0.06	   0.30	   -­‐68.1	  
	  
-­‐9.22	   0.00	  
 
Matched	   0.06	   0.06	   -­‐0.9	   98.7	   -­‐0.17	   0.86	  
Secondary	  School	   Unmatched	   0.14	   0.37	   -­‐55.2	  
	  
-­‐8.10	   0.00	  
 
Matched	   0.14	   0.15	   -­‐1.6	   97.1	   -­‐0.23	   0.82	  
High	  School	   Unmatched	   0.21	   0.17	   11.7	  
	  
2.01	   0.05	  
 
Matched	   0.21	   0.16	   12.7	   -­‐8.3	   1.57	   0.12	  
College	   Unmatched	   0.37	   0.06	   78.5	  
	  
17.68	   0.00	  
 
Matched	   0.37	   0.35	   4.3	   94.5	   0.42	   0.67	  
Graduate	  School	   Unmatched	   0.21	   0.03	   57.1	  
	  
14.20	   0.00	  
 
Matched	   0.21	   0.22	   -­‐5.4	   90.6	   -­‐0.50	   0.62	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…Continuation Table 8 
	  	   Comparison	   Mean	   	  	   %reduct	   t-­‐test	  
Variable	   Matched	   Treated	   Control	   %bias	   bias	   t	   p>t	  
Books	  Available	  at	  Home	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Around	  10	  books	   Unmatched	   0.16	   0.32	   -­‐38.3	  
	  
-­‐5.76	   0.00	  
 
Matched	   0.16	   0.15	   1.6	   95.8	   0.23	   0.82	  
Around	  25	  books	   Unmatched	   0.17	   0.19	   -­‐5.0	  
	  
-­‐0.80	   0.42	  
 
Matched	   0.17	   0.15	   5.2	   -­‐4.7	   0.67	   0.51	  
Around	  50	  books	   Unmatched	   0.19	   0.15	   12.6	  
	  
2.17	   0.03	  
 
Matched	   0.19	   0.23	   -­‐9.8	   22.6	   -­‐1.10	   0.27	  
Around	  100	  books	   Unmatched	   0.25	   0.09	   44.2	  
	  
8.79	   0.00	  
 
Matched	   0.25	   0.30	   -­‐12.6	   71.4	   -­‐1.28	   0.20	  
200	  or	  more	  books	   Unmatched	   0.20	   0.07	   40.3	  
	  
8.23	   0.00	  
 
Matched	   0.20	   0.14	   18.8	   53.3	   2.06	   0.04	  
Access	  to	  Health	  Services	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Popular	  Clinic	  or	  
Pharmacy	   Unmatched	   0.24	   0.66	   -­‐92.0	  
	  
-­‐14.53	   0.00	  
 
Matched	   0.24	   0.28	   -­‐8.8	   90.4	   -­‐1.12	   0.27	  
MSS,	  ISSSTE,	  or	  similar	  
inst.	   Unmatched	   0.43	   0.27	   34.7	  
	  
5.97	   0.00	  
 
Matched	   0.43	   0.44	   -­‐0.7	   98.0	   -­‐0.08	   0.94	  
Private	  Clinics	   Unmatched	   0.31	   0.04	   76.4	  
	  
19.16	   0.00	  
 
Matched	   0.31	   0.26	   12.3	   83.9	   1.17	   0.24	  
 	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Availability	  of	  Computer	   Unmatched	   0.86	   0.32	   130.8	  
	  
19.46	   0.00	  
 
Matched	   0.86	   0.86	   -­‐0.8	   99.4	   -­‐0.12	   0.91	  
Availability	  of	  Car	   Unmatched	   0.90	   0.54	   87.0	  
	  
12.21	   0.00	  
 
Matched	   0.90	   0.91	   -­‐2.4	   97.2	   -­‐0.42	   0.68	  
Availability	  of	  Telephone	   Unmatched	   0.89	   0.55	   81.1	  
	  
11.54	   0.00	  
	  	   Matched	   0.89	   0.89	   0.0	   100.0	   0.00	   1.00	  
 
In addition to that, Table 8 presents the “%standardized bias” indicator for each 
variable. According to Rosenbaum and Rubin formula (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985b), the 
standardized bias is defined as the difference of sample means in the treated and matched 
control subsamples as a percentage of the square root of the average of sample variances 
in the treated and the control groups. This is a type of effect-size measure. A successful 
matching procedure this indicator should ideally fall below 5% after matching (Caliendo 
& Kopeinig, 2005). There are a few variables where this condition is not met. For 
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example, the percentage bias of the variable Female is 8.3. There are about four percent 
more female students in private schools than in public schools after matching. However, 
this number can be misleading. In the unmatched sample, this difference is negligible. 
However, after matching, the percentage changed just a little by consequence of matching 
in the propensity score, which encompasses all variables in the model. Therefore, the 
matching is doing a good job, so much so that I cannot reject the associated null 
hypothesis of the t-test. Another similar case is the variable age. The difference in the 
average percentage between the two groups is negligible. However, the standardized bias 
still computes a value larger than 5. In this case, the t-test was also rejected. In fact, it is 
the same case in all the other variables whose standardized bias is larger than 5, with the 
exception of the dummy variable indicating whether there are more than 200 books or 
more available at home. 
Additionally, Table 8 presents “% reduct bias” figures (Sianesi, 2004), which 
indicate how much bias was eliminated by matching process. Ordinarily, negative values 
suggest that the bias increased as a result of matching. That is the case, for example, in 
the percentage of students who speak other language. The “% reduct bias” value is -
172.7. However, this indicator can be misleading. In the cases where there are variables 
with already very little bias before matching, the matching process might not make any 
progress in reducing the bias. However, since the bias is small, the “% reduct bias” does 
not offer much information. This is the case here, where the original difference 
(unmatched) in the percentage of students speaking other language was of less of one 
percent. For the most part, the matching brought good balance between the groups, as 
confirmed for the values of the “% reduct bias” measure, which shows only negative 
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results for variables that were already very much balanced in the unmatched sample. 
Overall, the matching through nearest neighbor matching is very good.  
 
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
Propensity score matching is no universal panacea. It corrects only for the biasing 
effect of the observed covariates. This approach depends for its success on the skill with 
which I have chosen covariates and have made a case for their inclusion in the modeling 
of selection. Propensity score matching does not correct for any bias that come from 
unobserved variables (Rubin, 1997). So, the adjustment for selection bias that I have done 
through propensity score matching is only effective to the extent that I exclude no 
relevant covariate from the selection modeling.  
To assess the robustness of the matching estimates vis-à-vis observed and 
unobserved bias, I implemented three kinds of sensitivity checks. First, I performed 
different kind of matching estimator to see if the results hold across different matching 
algorithms. Second, I took into account possible sources of bias related to the geographic 
location of the school. I fitted a multilevel model to take this into account. Third, I 
calculated the Rosenbaum bounds for the estimated average treatment effects of private 
school in math to explore robustness of matching estimates in the context of bias arising 
from unobserved variables.  
The sensitivity analyses will address the possibility that bias may alter the 
inferences I have established about the private school advantage for the poor.  
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4.4.1 Use of Different Matching Estimators 
To test the consistency of the matching results in the context of potential bias 
from observed variables, I compared the estimates obtained from the nearest neighbor-
matching estimator to the results obtained from 10 other matching algorithms. 
Considering that there is a lack of agreement on which matching algorithm is more 
appropriate, Becker and Ichino (2002) recommends testing several of them to analyze the 
sensitivity of the results to different matching schemes.  
I performed matching using the following matching algorithms: 
1) Nearest Neighbor Matching with caliper of 0.01: to avoid matching a treatment 
case with a control case too far away in terms of its propensity score value, in this 
matching scheme there is an imposition, or a caliper, on the maximum distance 
that can be tolerated between any given treatment case and its match. In this case 
the caliper is 0.01 sd. of the propensity score distribution. 
2) Nearest Neighbor Matching with caliper of 0.01 and common support: in this 
case, in addition to the imposition of caliper, all matching is forced within the 
common support region.  
3) 2-Nearest Neighbors Matching: instead of matching with one single observation, 
this approach allows to match each private school student with two public school 
students. It is has the advantage of using more information for the construction of 
the counterfactual. The inclusion of more cases reduced variance, but might 
increase bias by including poorer matches.   
  
50 
4) Radius Matching, Caliper = 0.01: in this matching scheme all control cases 
within the caliper (the radius) are selected and averaged to do the matching. 
5) Kernel Matching (epanechnikov) Bandwidth = 0.06: this is a non-parametric 
matching estimator that uses all individuals in the control group to construct the 
counterfactual. It gives each individual different weight in the estimation 
depending o its distance to the propensity score of the treatment. The further away 
the control case is from the treatment case, the less weight it receives in the 
estimation. The choice of bandwidth (sort of a caliper) and the choice of kernel 
function are important aspects that affect the estimation. All kernel matching are 
performed in this study using the epanechnikov function. The bandwidth used in 
this matching scheme is 0.06.  
6) Kernel Matching (epanechnikov) Bandwidth = 0.01: This case is very similar to 
the previous match, with the difference that the bandwidth is now narrower and it 
is set to 0.01. 
7) Kernel Matching (epanechnikov) Bandwidth = .01 and Trim = 10:  In addition to 
the parameters of the previous matching algorithm, in this case the observations 
that fall in regions where propensity scores for the non-treated are sparse are 
discarded, an exercise called “trimming”.  
8) Local Linear Regression Matching (tricube): local linear regression uses a more 
complex method than kernel matching to calculate the fitted value for treatment 
and control groups. In this case the predicted value falls onto a regression line 
specifically drawn to each set of values determined by the bandwidth. Local linear 
matching uses local linear regression to determine each fitted value.  
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9) Local Linear Regression Matching (tricube) Bandwidth = .0 and Trim = 10: In 
this case, a narrower bandwidth and a trim are also set. 
 
There is no perfect matching estimator, and each one of them present advantages 
and disadvantages8. There is a general trade-off between bias and efficiency (Caliendo & 
Kopeinig, 2005), especially in small samples (Heckman, Ichimura, & Todd, 1997). The 
matching methods that favor the quality of the selected matches, such as nearest neighbor 
and the methods that impose calipers and common support, tend to obtain results that are 
less biased. However, the avoidance of bad matches reduces the total number of matched 
cases, which in turn increases the variance of the estimates, reducing in this way the 
efficiency.  The opposite is also true: matching algorithms that tend to include more 
cases, such a radius matching and 2-nearest-neighbors matching, reduced the variance 
because of the increase in sample, but do so with a sacrifice in reduction of bias. 
Therefore, especial attention should be paid to the trade-off involved when selecting the 
best matching estimator.  
Table 9 presents the results of all matching schemes. The first row presents the 
results from the nearest neighbor matching that I have already applied to estimate the 
private school advantage. I have included it to facilitate comparisons with the results 
from the other methods.  
 
 
                                                
8 For a complete and easy review of matching estimator it advisable to read Caliendo (Caliendo & 
Kopeinig, 2005). For a more complete presentation of matching estimators illustrated with many examples, 
see (Guo & Fraser, 2010). 
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The average difference in performance in the standardized mathematics test of 
poor students in private and public schools across all matching algorithm is 46 point, or 
46% of a standard deviation.  The private school advantage ranges from 38.2 test points 
(from the nearest neighbor matching estimator) to 49.8 points (obtained from Local 
Linear Regression Matching, tricube). That is only a difference of 11.5 points.  
The trade-off between quality of matching and increase in variance that 
characterizes the choice of a matching scheme can be appreciated by looking at the 
different values of standard errors in Table 9. Some of the smaller standard errors are 
obtained in matching algorithms that include by design more control cases in the 
construction of the counterfactual, such as radius matching and kernel matching. On the 
other hand, the larger standard errors are obtained through matching techniques that 
privilege the inclusion of higher quality matches –and therefore, the inclusion of a 
smaller number of control cases- in the construction of the counterfactual, such as nearest 
neighbor matching and nearest neighbor matching with 0.01 caliper and imposition of 
common support. In this way, the bias could certainly diminish, although it involves a 
price in increase in variance.  
Despite the differences in values of standard errors, private school advantage is 
statistically significant in all cases, meaning that the differences among the various 
algorithms are not large enough to affect the common conclusion drawn from all 
matching techniques.  
In terms of matching quality, all matching algorithms present very similar results. 
The null hypothesis associated to the LR chi2, which states that the values of all the 
variables in the model are jointly balanced between the two groups, cannot be rejected in 
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all matching methods with very similar probability values. Also, the Pseudo R2 is 
considerable low across old methods and the Mean and Median Bias are both consistently 
low too, confirming the good match between students in both groups in all matching 
methods.  
I also calculated robust standard errors for the matching estimators that allow the 
performance of bootstrapping. Table 10 presents the results. The results are consistent 
with the results from other matching estimators. 
 
Table 10: Bootstrapping of standard error for the estimation of the effect 
of private schooling in Math. 
	  	   Observed	   Bootstrap	   	  	   	  	   Normal-­‐based	  
Matching	  Estimator	   Coefficient	   S.E.	   z	   P>z	  
[95%	  Conf.	  
Interval]	  
Kernel	  Matching	  
(epanechnikov)	  Bandwith	  =	  
0.06	   47.885	   10.828	   4.42	   0.000	   26.663	   69.107	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Local	  Linear	  Regression	  
Matching	  (tricube)	   49.785	   8.791	   5.66	   0.000	   32.554	   67.015	  
 
The consistency of matching estimates across various types of matching 
algorithms is an indication of robustness (Morgan & Harding, 2006). The evidence 
presented in this section proves that my earlier results are robust to sources of bias arising 
from the observed variables considered in this research. 
 
4.4.2 Contextual Effects 
 The basis for all matching algorithms used in the last section was the propensity 
scores obtained through the same logistic regression model. There are, however, two 
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important sources of bias and threats to validity that arises from this model that are 
important to address: 1) the nested structure of the EXCALE data (student nested within 
schools, nested within states or regions); and 2) the possible existence of a contextual 
effect that it has not been properly included in the model. This section is aimed to address 
these limitations. 
 According to Thoemmes and West (2010), the propensity score model should 
consider the clustered nature of the data when it is present, in both, the estimation of the 
propensity score and in the matching process. Multilevel models are the more appropriate 
way to accomplish this goal.  
Given the distribution of my sample, the cluster level that might be the source of 
more serious bias is the Mexican states where the student attended either public or private 
school9. States vary significantly with respect to their level of poverty, availability of 
private and public schools (even in urban cities), and many other possible hidden factors 
that might affect the probability of a child to get into private school, such as inter-state 
variation in parental interest in private education, or the quality itself of private schools. 
Table 11 show the distribution of students in public and private schools, broken down by 
the 32 Mexican states. There is an important dispersion of students in private and public 
schools across the whole country. This variation is intentional in the sense that Mexican 
Government (who conducted the Excale evaluation) wanted to ensure that any result 
drawn from the original data would be representative for the whole country.  
                                                
9 The aggregation of students within schools is being accounted in two different ways. First, the estimation 
of standard errors in each analysis is taking into account the lack of independence of individual within 
schools, so the errors are properly estimated regardless of the aggregation of students within school. 
Second, as part of the analyses conducted to answer the second research question, a whole set of school 
level variables that might affect student achievement are taken into account in the analyses.  
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Table 11: Distribution of students in the 
sample, broken down by type of school and 
state 
State Urban Public Private 
BAJA CALIFORNIA 67 9 
BAJA CALIFORNIA SUR 103 6 
CAMPECHE 116 8 
CHIAPAS 96 0 
CHIHUAHUA 65 9 
COAHUILA 100 10 
COLIMA 129 9 
DISTRITO FEDERAL 60 10 
DURANGO 52 9 
GUANAJUATO 99 5 
GUERRERO 119 0 
HIDALGO 71 11 
JALISCO 81 12 
MEXICO 82 16 
MICHOACAN 70 13 
MORELOS 123 20 
NAYARIT 83 14 
NUEVO LEON 44 14 
OAXACA 22 0 
PUEBLA 101 5 
QUERETARO 78 18 
QUINTANA ROO 113 15 
SAN LUIS POTOSI 88 14 
SINALOA 84 15 
SONORA 103 28 
TABASCO 131 13 
TAMAULIPAS 102 13 
TLAXCALA 159 11 
VERACRUZ 85 0 
YUCATAN 160 5 
ZACATECAS 72 9 
 
In other words, the number of cases in each state is not related to any particular 
characteristic of the state. Nonetheless, selection into private schools or achievement 
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itself can be affected by observed or hidden characteristics of each state. I estimated the 
value of intraclass correlation for understanding the variation of Private (the dummy 
variable indicating whether the student attends a private school, which is the outcome of 
the logistic regression) across states. The intraclass correlation value is 50% (ρ=0.50), 
meaning that 50% of the variation of Private is across states.  
There are two important considerations to take into account in making the right 
choice of model and conditioning scheme: one referred to how to model the influence of 
the variables of interest at each level of the hierarchical model; and the second referred to 
the appropriate way to do the matching based on the propensity scores (Thoemmes & 
West, 2010).  
An important decision to make is whether the clustering of the data is a central 
part of the design or if it is rather an incidental feature (Guo & Fraser, 2010; Thoemmes 
& West, 2010). When it is considered that clustering is a central feature of the design, for 
example, when a program is going to be evaluated intentionally in two different kinds of 
schools, the model has to be made in a way that it approximates a multi-site randomized 
trial. In this case, it is relevant that matching is made among individuals within the same 
cluster and that the balance of covariates across treatment and control groups is made 
within the same cluster (Hong & Raudenbush, 2006). However, when clusters are only an 
incidental part of the research design, for example, when individuals are drawn into 
treatment or control groups from different sites (neighbors, buildings or even schools), 
the design resembles a multi-site randomized experiment. In this case, matching can 
happen within or across clusters, and covariate balance can be achieved in the whole 
sample rather than within each cluster (Thoemmes & West, 2010). 
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 This dissertation falls in the second category. Location of the private and public 
schools where students attend can be considered an “incidental” part of the design, since 
it is not expected, a priori, that private school effect is different by design in each state. 
The decision of whether the clustering is incidental or not, does not have to do with the 
actual size of the cluster effect. A given level of aggregation can have a large effect and 
still be considered “incidental” from the perspective of an ideal random design.   
 In this case, the hierarchical model for the estimation of the propensity score can 
adopt the form of a fixed effect model. In this case, the selection model would include 
dummy variables representing each cluster. The inclusion of such system of dummy 
variables (32 variables, one representing each Mexican state) would capture the variation 
in cluster means, despite the fact that the source of such variation may remain unknown. 
Therefore, in a fixed effect model there would be no need to include any cluster-level 
variables since they would be constant within each cluster. Following Thoemes and West 
(2010) the model may adopt the following form: 
(1)    logit e x,w( )( ) = βp
p=1
P
∑ Xi + βc
c=1
C
∑ Ci + βi
i=1
I
∑ CiXi  
where logit e x,w( )( )  is the estimated logit of  the propensity score to enter into a private 
school, βp
p=1
P
∑ Xi  is a vector of student-level covariates and regression coefficients, the 
same variables included in calculation of the propensity score in the previous section, and 
C is a dummy variable indicating state membership, and βi
i=1
I
∑ CiXi  is a vector including 
all possible interactions between cluster and student-level covariates. Model (1) would 
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render unbiased estimates of intercepts and slopes within each cluster and the propensity 
scores would be therefore unaffected by state-level differences.  
 However, there are two characteristics of the fixed effect model that might be of 
concern in the context of this research: first, the fitting of the fixed effect model requires 
a fairly large sample size within each state; and second, because each state has a different 
regression equation (the general equation plus the variable and coefficient of each state) 
the matching of private and public school students had to be made within each cluster 
(Thoemmes & West, 2010), which again requires large sample size within each state.  
 Unfortunately, as it can be seen in Table 11, the size of the private school student 
sample within some states is considerable small, even to the extent that in some states 
there are more regression coefficients that students enrolled in private schools. Therefore, 
this model and matching scheme, although it theoretically takes into account the nested 
structure of the data and it removes the sources of bias that arises from differences at the 
state level, it is not appropriate for the structure and characteristics of my data. However, 
for illustrative purposes, I fitted model (1) and present the results by state in Table 12.  
 There is an average of 85 public school students per state on common support, but 
only an average of 11 private school students in the sample in common support.  
Therefore, the consequences of fitting a model in such a small sample become very 
apparent in the table. For example, the range of the private school effect is so wide that it 
makes the results not trustworthy. The private school effect ranges from -136.00 test 
points in Campeche to 100 test points in Hidalgo. In both cases the private school student 
sample is very small. Also, as it would be expected, the standard error values are very 
large, which makes the results hugely imprecise.  
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Table 12: Estimated effect of private school in mathematics calculated by logistic 
regression with fixed effect by Mexican state, and matched though nearest 
neighbor matching. 
	  	   No.	  of	  Students	  On	  Support	   	  	   Test	  Results	  for	  Math	  
State	   Urban	  Public	   Private	  
	   Urban	  
Public	   Private	  
	   	   	  
	  	   Difference	   S.E.	   T-­‐stat	  
Aguascalientes 109	   7	   	   598.9	   526.2	   72.7	   54.52	   1.33	  
Baja California 55	   8	   	   511.3	   503.0	   8.3	   41.15	   0.20	  
Baja California 
Sur 97	   5	   	   538.8	   515.4	   23.4	   62.48	   0.37	  
Campeche 98	   8	   	   463.9	   600.3	   -­‐136.3	   47.09	   -­‐2.89	  
Coahuila 89	   9	   	   589.2	   548.9	   40.4	   58.79	   0.69	  
Colima 121	   8	   	   519.7	   474.5	   45.2	   30.58	   1.48	  
Chihuahua 60	   7	   	   588.9	   510.2	   78.7	   66.37	   1.19	  
Distrito Federal 50	   9	   	   564.0	   471.1	   92.9	   29.75	   3.12	  
Durango 47	   6	   	   604.2	   526.6	   77.6	   89.26	   0.87	  
Guanajuato 87	   4	   	   556.1	   522.4	   33.7	   87.86	   0.38	  
Hidalgo 65	   11	   	   578.7	   478.2	   100.5	   39.35	   2.55	  
Jalisco 75	   11	   	   520.1	   602.3	   -­‐82.2	   61.00	   -­‐1.35	  
México 73	   16	   	   566.6	   545.5	   21.2	   45.49	   0.47	  
Michoacán 64	   12	   	   519.7	   536.4	   -­‐16.7	   48.43	   -­‐0.34	  
Morelos 109	   18	   	   585.1	   637.0	   -­‐52.0	   74.89	   -­‐0.69	  
Nayarit 75	   13	   	   608.5	   496.1	   112.4	   45.34	   2.48	  
Nuevo León 39	   13	   	   561.6	   480.8	   80.9	   50.37	   1.61	  
Puebla 88	   3	   	   514.8	   605.8	   -­‐91.0	   86.57	   -­‐1.05	  
Querétaro 69	   15	   	   617.8	   595.2	   22.6	   58.57	   0.39	  
Quintana Roo 99	   14	   	   582.6	   578.7	   3.8	   59.19	   0.06	  
San Luis Potosí 74	   13	   	   562.2	   516.5	   45.7	   39.19	   1.17	  
Sinaloa 70	   15	   	   625.3	   611.0	   14.3	   65.21	   0.22	  
Sonora 96	   27	   	   601.8	   542.7	   59.2	   35.28	   1.68	  
Tabasco 114	   13	   	   604.4	   514.2	   90.2	   44.19	   2.04	  
Tamaulipas 93	   12	   	   585.1	   588.7	   -­‐3.6	   56.49	   -­‐0.06	  
Tlaxcala 143	   11	   	   544.7	   530.2	   14.5	   42.77	   0.34	  
Yucatán 145	   5	   	   653.8	   541.6	   112.2	   60.57	   1.85	  
Zacatecas 65	   8	   	  	   539.5	   552.8	   -­‐13.3	   51.02	   -­‐0.26	  
 
In the case of research where clustering is an incidental part of the design and the 
sample size within clusters is small, as in this dissertation, a better alternative is to model 
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the hierarchical structure of the data in a way that it is possible to perform the matching 
across the whole sample, which overcome the within-cluster sample size limitation.  
Thoemes and West (2010) suggest fitting a multi-level model without the random 
components, so the equation that estimates the propensity score is the same across the 
entire sample, allowing in this way the matching across clusters. In this context, I will not 
be able control for state-level unobserved covariates –as in the fixed effect model. 
However, I will include in the model a state-level variable indicating the percentage of 
the population within the state living behind the official level of poverty10. Table 13 
presents the level of poverty (percentage of the state population living under the poverty 
line) of all Mexican states. I believe that this variable reflects the general level of 
educational opportunity within the state and that might also be proxy of other non-
measured cultural and educational variations of families across states, as it has been 
shown in other research (Treviño & Treviño, 2004). The inclusion of this variable allows 
me to model the hierarchical structure of the data and still manage to keep the model 
parsimonious. The model would adopt the following form:  
(2)    logit e x,w( )( ) = γ00 + γ p0
p=1
P
∑ Xij + γ0q
q=1
Q
∑ Pj + γ1i
i=1
I
∑ PjXij  
where logit e x,w( )( )  is the estimated logit of the propensity score to enter into a private 
school, γ00 is the grand mean of math achievement for students in the sample, γ p0
p=1
P
∑ Xij  is 
a vector of student-level covariates and regression coefficients, P is a variable indicating 
                                                
10 The official measure of poverty is determined by the National Council for the Evaluation of Social Policy 
(CONEVAL for its acronym in Spanish) and it is reported once a year. For more information see 
http://www.coneval.gob.mx  
  
62 
state-poverty level, and γ1i
i=1
I
∑ PjXij  is a vector including all possible interactions between 
state poverty level and student-level covariates. The interaction effects are an important 
part of the model. The level-1 covariates (variables related to individual characteristics or 
characteristics of the student’s family included in the original logistic model) might affect 
selection into private school different at every cluster level (in this case at the state level) 
as a function of the state level of poverty. 
Table 13: Percentage of Mexican states 
living under the line of poverty 
State Poverty (%) 
Aguascalientes 38.1 
Baja California 31.5 
Baja California Sur 31.0 
Campeche 50.5 
Coahuila 27.8 
Colima 34.7 
Chiapas 78.5 
Chihuahua 38.8 
Distrito Federal 28.5 
Durango 51.6 
Guanajuato 48.5 
Guerrero 67.6 
Hidalgo 54.7 
Jalisco 37.0 
México 42.9 
Michoacán 54.7 
Morelos 43.2 
Nayarit 41.4 
Nuevo León 21.0 
Oaxaca 67.0 
Puebla 61.5 
Querétaro 41.4 
Quintana Roo 34.6 
San Luis Potosí 52.4 
Sinaloa 36.7 
Sonora 33.1 
Tabasco 57.1 
Tamaulipas 39.0 
Tlaxcala 60.3 
Veracruz 57.6 
Yucatán 48.3 
Zacatecas 60.2 
Source: CONEVAL, 2010 
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The model was fitted using the xtemelogit function of stata. Results for the fitting 
of this model are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix. According to the information 
presented in the table, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that states that all logistic 
regression coefficients are equal to zero at the 1% significant level (Wald chi2 = 402.02, 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000). Therefore, the results indicate that the fitting of multilevel model 
(2), which takes into account the state level of poverty –in addition to the student-level 
covariates-, is appropriate to estimate the propensity scores for the matching analysis.  
 
4.4.3 Selection of Final Propensity Score Model and Matching Algorithm 
 After fitting model (2) I performed nearest neighbor propensity score matching. 
Table 14 presents the results and the computation of the private school advantage. As in 
Table 6, the first raw shows the straight up difference for all students, and the second raw 
(labeled ATT) shows the difference for the matched groups. 
 
Table 14: Differences in ATT in Mathematics between students with 
Oportunidades scholarship in Public and Private schools, using the 
nearest neighbor matching estimator after estimating propensity score 
through a multilevel model (On support: 2,653 public students, 301 
private students) 
Sample	   Private	  School	   Public	  School	   Difference	   S.E.	   T-­‐stat	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  Unmatched	   573.71	   494.34	   79.37	   5.47	   14.50	  
ATT	   573.71	   525.87	   47.84	   13.29	   3.60	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According to Table 14, private school students who are beneficiaries of 
Oportunidades program outperformed their public counterparts by on average of 48 test 
points or 48% of a standard deviation.  
 The multilevel model is a better choice of obtaining the propensity scores for the 
students in the sample. In addition to including in the model the same set of first-level 
variables included in (1), it also account for inter-state variations in the probability of 
enrolling in private school as a consequence of the inclusion of a second level variable 
(Poverty) and the interaction terms between this variable and all personal single-level 
variables.  
 In addition to that, the propensity scores obtained through fitting the multi-level 
model (2) also allow for better quality of matching than the matching obtained through 
the fitting of a single-level logistic regression model and the use of nearest neighbor 
matching performed after, as shown in the previous section. The mean of standardized 
percentage bias for all variables included in the logistic regression model is 6.48, whereas 
it is 5.88 for the multilevel model. Graph 1 shows the standardized % bias by variable. It 
is clear that this model is doing a good job of balancing variables between the two 
groups. Therefore, further analyses are conducted using information from the multilevel 
model.  
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4.4.4 Unobserved Heterogeneity and Rosenbaum Bounds 
 Rosenbaum (2002, 2005) suggests to be mindful of a distinction between overt 
bias and hidden bias. Overt bias is visible to the researcher and is usually reflected in the 
variables contained in the data. Hidden bias, on the other hand, is not visible to the 
researcher; the information that represents it is not recorded. Unlike overt bias, which can 
be properly modeled and corrected through matching –as I did in the previous sections of 
this research- unobserved heterogeneity might affect both the probability of selection into 
treatment -- private school in this case -- and the ultimate outcome -- achievement in 
math (Guo & Fraser, 2010).  
In the absent of randomization, which automatically avoids hidden bias in 
observational studies, it is important to assess the extent to which hidden bias might 
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affect the estimates of treatment to the point in which they render them untrustworthy 
(Guo & Fraser, 2010; Rosenbaum, 2002).  
To assess how robust are the matching estimates with respect to unobservable 
variables, I conducted the Rosenbaum bound sensitivity analysis to assess how strong the 
hidden selection bias would need to be to alter the matching estimates. The basic idea is 
to identify a number Γ (gamma), which would capture the degree of association of a 
hidden characteristic (student motivation, for example) with the treatment and outcome, 
necessary for it to explain the observed impact (Duvendack & Palmer-Jones, 2012). This 
unit Γ is expressed as log odds, and the purpose is identify a cutoff point of Γ at which 
the matching estimates would be statistically insignificant. In the context of the present 
research, the basic idea is to find out if the inference about the effect of private schooling 
in the achievement in math of poor students may be altered by unobserved factors to the 
point that it undermine the results drawn from the matching analysis (Caliendo & 
Kopeinig, 2005). 
This approach has been successfully applied in several research studies across 
many fields (Aakvik, 2001; Caliendo, Reinhard, & Thomsen, 2005; Duvendack & 
Palmer-Jones, 2012; Han, 2012; Mavromaras, McGuinness, & King Fok, 2007). I 
calculated the Rosenbaum bounds for the estimated average treatment effect of private 
school in math. I obtained the results by performing the “rbounds” command in Stata 
(Diprete & Gangl, 2004).  
Table 15 presents the results. A p-value above 0.05 indicates a critical level of 
gamma that renders the matching estimates invalid (Guo & Fraser, 2010).  
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Table 15: Rosenbaum Bound Sensitivity Test for the 
Private School Effect in Math Achievement Test. 
Gamma Rosenbaum	  Bounds	  
Γ Minimum	   Maximum	  
1	   0	   3.00E-­‐10	  
1.1	   2.30E-­‐12	   2.10E-­‐08	  
1	   1.60E-­‐14	   6.30E-­‐07	  
1.3	   1.10E-­‐16	   9.90E-­‐06	  
1.4	   0	   0.000093	  
1.5	   0	   0.000576	  
1.6	   0	   0.002575	  
1.7	   0	   0.00878	  
1.8	   0	   0.023951	  
1.9	   0	   0.054289	  
2	   0	   0.10542	  
2.1	   0	   0.179856	  
Γ = log	  odds	  of	  differential	  assignment	  due	  to	  unobserved	  factors	  
 
Results show that my estimation of the effect of private school on math (48% of a 
standard deviation) is fairly robust to bias from hidden variables. A hidden variable (or a 
set of them) would need to increase the odds of enrolling into private school by 90% 
(Γ=1.9, p<0.054) to make the private school effect invalid.  
According to DiPrete and Ganglg (2004), the Rossenbaum bounds represent the 
“worst-case” scenario with respect to the robustness of matching estimates, meaning that 
it is very likely that the actual bias associated to hidden variables is actually smaller than 
the value of Γ .  
 The study appears to be robust against hidden bias.  
 
4.5 Interpreting the Effect Size Estimates in the Context of Other Studies 
The 0.48 sd effect size of private school identified in the previous section, is larger 
relative to much of the existing literature, especially if we compare it to the results of true 
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experiments (or good quasi-experiments) of private schools conducted in the U.S. One 
example is the results of The New York City school choice program, the largest private 
school scholarship experiment conducted to date, which provided vouchers for 1,300 
children from low-economic background in grades K-4 in the New York City public 
schools (Mayer, Peterson, Myers, Clark Tuttle, & Howell, 202). Scholarship recipients 
were selected randomly through a lottery held in 1997. The impact of a voucher offer on 
test scores over a three-year period (the intent to treat effect) was statistically significant 
for African Americans. The effect size was 0.14 standard deviation for reading and 0.26 
standard deviations for math11. The estimated effect of vouchers on math in this case is 
almost half the size the one found in this dissertation.  However, if we consider the 
impact of actually attending a private school (the treatment effect), whether for one, two 
or three years, which is a more comparable result to the findings obtained in this research 
(Oportunidades children, who actually attended private schools), the estimate is 0.37 
standard deviations for the combined test scores (reading and mathematics) for African 
Americans (Mayer et al., 202). This result is still 30% smaller that the 0.48 size effect 
reported in the dissertation, but not as far away than the intent to treatment estimate.  
The private school effects found in this dissertation are also larger if we compare it to 
results of private schools across different states. In an evaluation conducted by the 
Institute of Education Sciences, researchers evaluated the impact of 36 charter middle 
schools in 15 states, all of which selected students based on randomized admission 
                                                
11 In a reexamination of the data of the New York City school choice program, Kruger and Zhu (202) found 
that after considering the full sample (including those with missing baseline data, excluded from the 
original study) the effect of the voucher program in African Americans decreases importantly and became 
not statistically significant. They also found the results for this ethnic group to be sensitive to the way 
race/ethnicity was defined. The authors of the original study have also replied to this argument (Myers & 
Mayer, 2003). There does not seem to be a consensus yet as to the validity of the results. 
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lotteries (Gleason, Clark, Clark Tuttle, Dwoyer, & Silverberg, 2010). Although there is a 
large variation in the effect of the charter schools included in the study, on average, 
charter schools with the largest proportion of disadvantaged students had a positive 
accumulated effect on the second year after the lottery on math scores of 0.18 standard 
deviations.  This is less than half the effect found in my dissertation.  
In a report containing both, observational and lottery studies, about Boston schools, 
researchers found that for each year of attendance to a Charter middle school, there is an 
estimated raise in student achievement of 0.18 to 0.54 standard deviations in mathematics 
relative to those attending Boston public schools (Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2009)12. This 
shows that only in the more optimistic of scenarios, the private school effect would be 
closer to the estimates presented in this dissertation. 
I hypothesize that there are two factors that may be responsible for the larger size of 
the private school estimate reported in this dissertation relative to effect size found in 
previous research. One possible explanation is that the actual counterfactual of the study 
is private school effect with only poor families in urban areas in Mexico. In this way, the 
large results may be only associated to private schooling for the poor in urban settings 
and not generalizable to all private schools serving the poor in Mexico.  A second 
potential explanation may have to do with the nature of the treatment. I have restricted 
my analyses to families who received a scholarship as part of a conditional cash transfer 
program (CCT) targeting population living in extreme poverty. Therefore, the larger 
effects may be explained by the interaction of these other program components with 
                                                
12 The bottom limit results are estimated through the implementation of an observational study, using 
baseline scores and other demographic variables in the model; the upper limit of this effect is was actually 
calculated with a model based on lottery results and the inclusion of demographic variables in the model.  
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private schooling, or by the context that Oportunidades creates, which would 
hypothetically enable students to more readily benefit from the superior quality of private 
schools.  
In the following section I will discuss these possible explanations in detail.  
 
4.5.1 Targeting the Right Counterfactual 
The focus of this study is poor students attending private schools in urban cities in 
Mexico. Targeting the right counterfactual may be responsible in part for the large private 
school effects identified in this dissertation.  
Studies covering a wide variety of states and districts in the US show non-positive 
average effects of charter schools (Zimmer et al., 2003) or small negative effects for the 
white majority (Center for Research on Education Outcomes, 2013). Private school 
effects, in general, tend to be larger for the poor and the minority living in urban areas, 
like the case of the population studied in this dissertation. 
According to existing literature, the urban poor population (which very often is part to 
a minority group) is the one benefiting the most from private schooling. In the case of the 
New York City voucher experiment, most students attending private schools perform at 
similar levels than those attending public schools (Mayer et al., 202). In other words, 
private school did not seem to make a difference for the predominant population.  
However, there was a significant voucher impact on test scores (0.14 and 0.26 standard 
deviations) for African Americans, a population disproportionally poor. In a report 
analyzing the effect of 36 charter middle schools across 15 states, one of the main 
findings is that charter school’s impacts on student achievement are inversely related to 
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students’ family income level (Gleason et al., 2010). In this study, charter schools serving 
more low-income students had a statistically significant positive effect on math test 
scores. On average, charter schools with the largest proportion of disadvantaged students 
had a positive effect on math scores of 0.18 s.d. On the other hand, there was an average 
negative effect of 0.24 s.d. for schools serving fewer economically disadvantaged 
students. In addition to that, Charter middle schools in large urban areas had significant 
impact on achievement, as opposed to suburban charter schools. Schools located in urban 
areas had an impact on year 2 math scores of 0.16 standard deviations, compared to the 
negative effects found on suburban area (Gleason et al., 2010). Abdulkadiroglu and his 
colleagues (2009) found similar results in a study comparing regular, charter and pilot 
schools in the Boston area. In this case, urban charter schools, which have an average of 
73 percent of students qualifying for free or reduced price lunch, have a positive effect on 
learning.  
In a recent study that analyzes charter schools in 27 different states (including data 
from more than 1.5 million students in charter schools and matched comparison groups), 
researchers found that Black students, student living in poverty, and English language 
learners were the ones truly benefitting from charter schooling (Center for Research on 
Education Outcomes, 2013). In fact, charter schools are even more beneficial to students 
that combine multiple challenges, like being Spanish or Black living under poverty or 
with language limitations. According to this study, poor black students who attend charter 
schools gain 36 additional days of learning in math and 29 days of learning in reading. 
Hispanic ELL students benefited even more. By attending charter schools they gained 50 
additional days of learning in reading and 43 days of additional learning in math, in 
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contrast with comparable students in public schools (Center for Research on Education 
Outcomes, 2013). 
Of a special interest is a multi-year causal study that analyzes the achievement of 93 
percent of the New York City charter school students enrolled in grade 3 through 12 
(Hoxby, Muraka, & Kang, September 2009). Since Charter school applicants in New 
York City tend to be more likely black and poor than the average student in New York’s 
traditional public schools, the results of this study are particularly interesting for this 
dissertation, focusing in the effect of private schooling on the urban poor in Mexico. A 
student who attended charter school for all grades kindergarten through eight would close 
about 86% of the racial achievement gap in mathematics and 66% of the achievement gap 
in English in the state. 
The literature on voucher schools adhered to the No Excuses approach to education 
also confirms the urban-poor-minority exclusive effect of private schooling. The “No 
Excuses” schools emphasize a series of educational practices though to be directly link to 
student achievement, such as frequent testing, increased instructional time, parental 
involvement, strict student discipline, and focus on math and reading achievement 
(Carter, 2000; Thernstrom & Therenstrom, 2004).  Angrist et al. (2011) found that 
Massachusetts No Excuses urban charter schools increase student achievement in math as 
opposed to Massachusetts non-urban charter schools. In fact, charter schools are more 
effective with minority low-baseline achievers, who are predominantly poor students.  
In a quasi-experimental evaluation, researchers found that schools affiliated with the 
Knowledge is Power Program (KIPP), which are emblematic of the No Excuses approach 
to education, show achievement gains for limited English proficiency (LEP) students, 
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special education students, and low-baseline students, but not for any other student group 
(Angrist, Dynarski, Kane, Pathak, & Walters, 2010). This study was conducted in the 
Academy Lynn KIPP charter school, a New England school characterized by a 
predominant Hispanic population (Angrist et al., 2010). 
The research on the performance of private Catholic schools also confirms that the 
private school’s effect is mainly positive in the case of poor urban students. For example, 
Evans (1995) finds that Catholic private schools have a positive effect on the student’s 
probability of high school completion and the probability of starting college. The effect in 
this case is larger if the student is black and living in urban areas and practically no 
existent for any other group. Neal (1997) found that Catholic schools, concentrated in 
urban areas, do increase significantly the educational attainment of urban students, 
especially of urban minorities. On the other hand, the private school effect is modest for 
urban whites and almost non-existent for suburban students Results were similar for more 
recent cohorts. Grogger et al. (2000) found that Catholic high school attendance increases 
the probability of graduation by about 24 percent for urban minorities, and that the results 
for the predominant group are not significant. Altonji et al. (2005) report that Catholic 
high schools increased graduation rates and college attendance rates for urban minorities.  
This review shows that private school advantage holds mainly for the urban poor, 
which is the case of the group studied in this research: poor families looking for better 
schooling options in urban areas in Mexico. My contention is that the use of the right 
counterfactual may help explaining the larger effects found in this research. 
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4.5.2 Nature of the Treatment 
Oportunidades is a poverty alleviation program targeting families living in extreme 
poverty in Mexico. This program articulates different development initiatives of the 
federal government aimed at combating poverty nationwide. In addition to the cash 
transfer component, Oportunidades comprises a variety of social programs in the areas of 
financial inclusion, self-employment, education, health, diet habits, and general 
wellbeing. This kind of model emphasizing the provision of wrap-around services takes 
into account the whole need of the poor family, including the needs of the children. It is 
very likely that the large effects of private schooling found in this dissertation are the 
product of the interaction of a comprehensive set of interventions with private schooling. 
In this scenario, the bundle of services and programs comprised in Oportunidades would 
produce effects in achievement only in combination with private school characteristics, 
either measured or unmeasured in this study. For example, it might be the case that the 
increase on student school attendance caused by Oportunidades (as it will be shown later 
in this section), only makes a difference in achievement in students attending private 
schools, if students in private schools, for example, experience more learning time than 
students in public schools. Another possible explanation is that the presumably superior 
higher quality of private schools are more likely to have effect on children for whom 
other supports are present –as provided by Oportunidades—than for children facing the 
stresses of poverty. So Oportunidades creates a context that enables students to more 
readily benefit from the superior quality of a private education, and for this reason the 
effects found in this research are higher than the effects documented in other studies 
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where those enabling conditions of a comprehensive poverty alleviation program are not 
present. 
One of the components of Oportunidades that might be positively interacting with 
private schooling, is the income support element provided by the program in the way of a 
cash transfer. Researchers have provided different explanations as for why family income 
might affect children development. Given the link between poverty in an early age and 
children development, supporting the income of families with young children may have 
long-lasting effects on educational outcomes. For example, Dahl and Lochner (2008) use 
variations in the amount of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) as an instrumental 
variable to measure the causal impact of increase of income in educational achievement. 
They found that a $1,000 increase in income raises combined math and reading test 
scores by 6 percent standard deviations. Also, income support policies ensure a basic 
level of sustenance to families, which might not only help them escape poverty, but also 
provide them with a certain sense of relieve and tranquility. In fact, one of the vehicles 
through which poverty might negatively influence children’s outcomes, is through the 
effects that parental psychological distress commonly associated to poverty causes 
(McLoyd, 1990). Parents in poverty are much likely to experience high level of 
psychological distress, which in turn affects children’s socioemotional wellbeing through 
its impact on parent’s behavior and practices towards the children. For example, Parker et 
al. (1999) report that poverty adversely affects children’s outcomes, especially school 
readiness. Attitudes and practices commonly associated to poverty and the stress it 
produces, such as parental aggravation and strictness, have a negative effect on child’s 
distractibility and hostility in the classroom, which in turn predict a decrease in 
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associative vocabulary skills. The income relief located at the center of Oportunidades 
might be positively affecting educational achievement through this mean13. Of course, 
this would only be true if the positive family effect produced by this component of the 
program positively interacts with characteristics only present or predominant in private 
schools.  
Besides alleviating family and environmental stress, there are other pathways 
through which Oportunidades may affect child development and educational outcomes. 
Oportunidades may also positively affect parental investment. For example, Gordon et al 
(2008) reported that increases in incomes generated by expansion of the EITC program 
targeting the poor, improved low-income children’s educational achievement.  In the 
same sense, research in Mexico has shown that there is a positive association between 
income level and the size of family educational investment on their children, such as 
investment in books and other resources associated with better educational outcomes 
(Treviño, 2005).  
In addition to that, parents who are poor have more mental health problems than 
economically advantaged parents, which translate into child rearing problems (McLoyd, 
1990). It is possible that the poverty alleviation provided by the program is contributing 
positively to the mental health of parents and, through this way, the wellbeing of children. 
But Oportunidades might also positively affect the IQ of children. Research has proved 
that persistent poverty has detrimental effects on IQ and school achievement (McLoyd, 
1998). The economic relieve provided to the families by Oportunidades might have 
positive effects on cognitive development of children and their performance in school.  
                                                
13 See Magnuson and Votruba-Drzal (2008) for a complete review of consequences of childhood poverty.  
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But the effect of Oportunidades in children achievement can be even more direct 
than what the arguments presented above implied. A number of recent studies suggest 
that wrap-around interventions with an educational program at the center might be 
responsible for large achievement effects on children. For example, using admission 
lotteries Curto and Fryer (2011) reported that a charter boarding school in Washington 
DC called SEED, raised substantially the educational achievement of participants. SEED 
combines a charter school adhered to the “No Excuses” model and a five-day-a-week 
boarding program. Attending a SEED school increased student achievement in 
mathematics by 0.23 standard deviations per year. It is very difficult to technically 
disentangle the effect of the individual component of these comprehensive programs. In 
this case, for example, we cannot say with certainty if the achievement effect is mainly 
due to the charter school or if it is a combined effect of the charter and the boarding 
component.  
Another example of this kind of comprehensive intervention is the Harlem 
Children’s Zone (HCZ). The HCZ combines community programs with charter 
schooling. According to a lottery and instrumental variable identification strategy, 
Dobbie and Fryer (2009) found that the effects of the program in elementary school, 
closed the racial achievement gap in English Language Art (ELA) and in mathematics. 
Students in the HCZ elementary school raised their achievement 0.80 to 1.5 standard 
deviations in math and ELA. These results are even larger than the ones found in this 
dissertation. Authors of this study believe that it is the interaction of community 
programs and school intervention what produces these large results. They even 
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entertained the idea that the community programs work as a key “technology shifter” in 
the manufacture of achievement.  
The interaction between private schooling and the bundle of complementary 
social programs comprised in Oportunidades, might explain in part the large private 
school effect on achievement found in this dissertation. Oportunidades might have an 
effect on student achievement by providing certain home conditions and incentives that 
positively interact with private schooling. In fact, different studies have already found 
that Oportunidades has a positive significant effect on school enrollment (Parker, Todd, 
& Wolpin, 2006), school attainment (Behrman, Gallardo-García, Parker, Todd, & Vélez-
Grajales, 2010; Lalive & Cattaneo, 2006) and students’ time devoted to homework 
(Behrman et al., 2010). Researchers have found that there are even significant spillover 
effects of Oportunidades to program non-participants (Lalive & Cattaneo, 2006).  
All this evidence shows that the large size of the private school advantage could 
be attributed in part to the fact that the treatment under study is much more complex than 
just private schooling. 
 
4.6 Summary and Discussion of Results of Private School Advantage 
With the analyses presented in the previous sections, I am ready to answer my 
first research question and state that there is indeed a private school advantage. On 
average, private school students who are beneficiaries of Oportunidades program 
outperformed their public counterparts by an average of 48 test points, or 48% of a 
standard deviation. 
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Although all students included in this research are considered poor (they all are 
beneficiaries of Oportunidades) differences in important family variables suggest that 
students attending private schools are relatively more advantaged than those attending 
public schools. Therefore, it is important to account statistically for these differences 
associated with the selection bias. The results obtained through propensity score 
matching are technically reliable. The findings have passed different robustness checks. 
Results are robust to the use of different matching estimators, and also robust to the 
observed and hidden bias that may arise from the geographic location of schools. Also, 
the performance of Rosenbaum bound sensitivity analysis has shown that a hidden bias 
would need to increase the odds of entering into a private school by 90% to actually 
affect the estimation of the private school advantage. 
The private school effects found through propensity score analysis are indeed very 
large compared to previous literature. As explained earlier, these large results might have 
to do in part with two factors. On the one hand, the use of the right counterfactual for this 
research: poor students attending private urban schools. In this way, the private school 
advantage would be larger than if non-urban poor were part of the sample. On the other 
hand, large results might be attributed to the fact that all students in the sample attending 
private schools are all beneficiaries of Oportunidades,  a comprehensive poverty 
alleviation program. This implies that the treatment is more complex than just private 
schooling, and that some components of Oportundiades might be positively interacting 
with private schooling to produce these large effects.  
For poor students, schooling in general seems to make more of a difference than 
for non-poor students. I estimated the intraclass correlation of poor students’ achievement 
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in mathematics across schools. The results show that 30% of the variation in student 
achievement is due to difference among schools (ρ=0.30). This result is larger if we 
compare it to the intraclass correlation of regular students in mathematics, which is about 
20% according to previous research (Treviño & Treviño, 2004). 
There are some indications that the weight that SES has in student achievement 
has been decreasing in the last years in Mexico. The 2012 Pisa Report (OECD, 2014) 
shows that the role that SES has on explaining the achievement gap between 
disadvantaged students and those that are economically better off has decreased in the last 
years. However, the difference in school resources among the Mexican schools is one of 
the largest in the OECD countries, and the within-country variation in test scores 
compared with other countries is still very large. The information on the PISA report, 
therefore, seems to be in contrast with the findings reported in this dissertation. A 
possible explanation might be related to the fact that the Mexican educational system 
tends to become less unequal in the higher educational levels. PISA report is based on 15-
year old students, mainly in low-middle school, whereas I am reporting results for 
elementary school, an educational level that presents different sociodemographic profile. 
In addition to that, I am concentrating my analyses on the performance of poor students 
in private schools with respect to poor students in public schools. This population is a 
more restricted sample that the one used for the PISA evaluation, which was 
representative of the whole student population. The population focus of this research 
tends to have a higher variance than the general student population and, therefore, tends 
to be more sensitive a changes in school resources.  
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5. The Determinants of Private School Advantage: What Factors Make a 
Difference? 
In this section I am presenting the statistical analyses aimed at answering my 
second research question. Now that I have established that there is indeed a private school 
advantage, it is important to identify what school factors explain this advantage, beyond 
the differences between types of students that I attempted to correct through propensity 
score matching.  
I fitted several taxonomies of regression models, regressing student’s achievement 
in Mathematics on PRIVATE. I controlled for self-sorting into educational sector by 
including in the model the propensity score variable (pscore) created in the last section as 
a product of the propensity score matching estimation. I also included a set of peer group 
variables in the baseline model. Peer group effect is one of the most important factors 
explaining educational achievement. Although it is true that there has not been any 
previous educational policy in Mexico that attempted to alter this important educational 
input, it is not possible to properly identify the effect other school factors without 
accounting for this effect. I then added systematically to the base-line model different set 
of predictors measuring the four main factors of school performance focus of this 
dissertation: physical resources, school management, teacher quality, and teaching 
practices and classroom organization.  
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5.1 Analytical Methodology 
In this dissertation, achievement is modeled following this specification14: 
 
(3)  A = f (I, B, SI, P) 
 
where achievement A is a function of a vector of student’s  ascribed characteristics I, such 
as and innate abilities (intelligence, for example); B is a vector of family background and 
socioeconomic status; SI is a vector of school inputs and management; and P is a vector 
of influences of peer group characteristics.  
I am interested in analyzing the extent to what school inputs (SI) explain the 
private school advantage found in the previous section. Especially, I am interested in 
analyzing the school factors object of most of the educational policies implemented in 
Mexico. To do this, first I need to account for the effect of innate ability, family 
background, and peer-group characteristics, and then isolate the effect that the inputs of 
interest have in student achievement in mathematics among poor students in Mexico: 
physical resources, school management, teacher quality, and teaching practices and 
school organization. My hypothesis is that if I consider school differences in these inputs 
(once I account for the effects of family background and peer-group characteristics), there 
is no really significant difference between both public and private schools, and that the 
private school advantage found in the previous section should fade away.  
                                                
14 This explanation falls in the tradition of education production function. For an early discussion on the 
estimation of educational production functions, see Hanushek (1979) 
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To fully explain student achievement, therefore, it is necessary to use information 
about innate ability, family background and peer-group characteristics. However, it is 
very difficult to include student’s ascribed characteristics (I) in education production 
functions, unless information about cognitive skills is available. In my dissertation, 
however, I do not count with cognitive test results or information about previous 
achievement, so achievement results can be affected by personal skills without having a 
way to identify it. Therefore, the only way to really estimate the effects of the main 
school inputs object of policy makers in Mexico in the context of the data at hand is to 
remove the effect of family background. It would also be necessary to account for peer-
group effects, one of the factors with a recurrent effect in the literature. 
Family socioeconomic background has been part of educational production 
function since the earlier studies appeared after the Coleman Report (Hanushek, 1986) 
and it has been almost unequivocally associated to achievement differences and 
variations in other well-being outcomes (Bradley & Corwyn, 2002). If family and 
environment has important weight in student achievement, it is likely that students from 
more educated families self-select themselves into private school, which would bias the 
estimates of mathematics achievement upwards. On the other hand, peer group 
composition is at the same time one of the dimensions included in education production 
functions since the late 60’s and one of the most difficult to identify in statistical models 
(Hanushek, 1979; Murnane, 1975, 1984). Attending a school in which most students 
come from homes that they themselves provide strong support for academic achievement 
may also have a positive effect on the achievement of the individual student.  
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5.1.2 Identification Strategy 
 I am fitting a taxonomy of regression models, regressing student’s achievement in 
Mathematics (MATH) on my question predictor, PRIVATE, and main baseline variables. 
The objective is to form a baseline control model that removes the effect of family 
background and peer-group composition in the school. The base-line model has the 
following form:  
 
(4) 
MATHij = β0 +β1 Pr ivatej +β2 Propensity+ β3
i=1
∑ PEij +εij  
 
Where Private is a variable indicating whether the student belongs to a private school or 
not, Propensity is a variable containing the propensity scores for each student I obtained 
from fitting model (2) from the previous section, and β3
i=1
∑ PE  is a vector of peer-group 
variables and coefficients, and εij is an individual random error. By introducing in the 
model the propensity score, I am directly controlling for the effect of background 
variables in student achievement, at least as it pertains to overt bias. In addition to that, by 
introducing a set of variables measuring peer group effect, I am controlling for the 
aggregation effect of peer-group composition. It is important to mention that some of the 
variables used to account for the student’s peer-group have some important limitations 
and, therefore, it is important to exercise caution when interpreting these results. In this 
way, the magnitude and direction of β1, the coefficient of Private, would capture only the 
private school advantage, net of background and peer-group effects.  
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After fitting the baseline control model, I systematically included covariates that 
describe school physical resources, school management, teacher quality and teaching 
practices and classroom organization to the baseline control model.  The final model has 
the following form: 
 (5)   
MATHij = β0 +β1 Pr ivatej +β2 Propensity+ β3
i=1
∑ PEij + β3
i=1
∑ PhysRe s+
β3
i=1
∑ SchMng+ β3
i=1
∑ TQ+ β3
i=1
∑ TpractCOijij +εij
 
 
Where PhysRes is a vector of school physical resources, SchMng represents a vector of 
school management variables, TQ is a vector of teacher quality variables, and TpractCO 
is a vector of teacher practices and classroom organization variables. The rest of the 
variables are defined as in model (4). I am examining how the estimated coefficient on 
predictor PRIVATE changes as variables accounting for level of physical resources, 
school management, teacher quality, teaching practices and classroom organization, are 
added to the model. If the achievement differential were explained in part by these 
predominant school factors, I would expect my estimate of β1, to decrease progressively 
on the introduction of these predictors. A positive and statistically significant β1 
coefficient remaining after the final model has been estimated would indicate that a 
portion of the private school advantage is not fully captured by variables representing 
level of physical resources, school management, teacher quality, and teaching practices 
and classroom organization, net of background variables and peer-group effects. 
 I will first fit models with the baseline model and each particular school factor, 
and then I will fit a combined model with all factors added to the baseline model.  
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5.1.3 Contextual Effects 
 There is still some source of bias that can arise from the context where the public 
and private schools are located. One way to take into account these contextual factors is 
to build a mixed model by introducing a set of dummies representing each of the 32 states 
where the public and private schools are located. Unfortunately, as I showed in Section 
4.4.2, the number of cases by state and the number of variables in the model makes this 
estimation not feasible. Including a full set of the covariates considered in this research in 
a small inter-state sample makes the variance very high, which leads to problems in the 
correct estimation of standard errors and makes the results not trustworthy.  
 Therefore, instead of building a fixed effects model with indicators of state, I will 
build a fixed effect model with indicators of the poverty region. I divided Mexico into 
four poverty regions. Each state belongs to one of these regions depending on the 
percentage of the population that live under the official line of poverty within each state. 
Categories go from 1 to 4, depending of the extension of poverty within the state. States 
that have between 21% and 34.7% of their population below the poverty level are 
categorized as 1. States that have between 34.8% and 42.9% of their population below the 
poverty level are categorized as 2. Those states with 43% and 54.7% of their population 
living in poverty are categorized as 3. And finally, the states with 54.8% and 78.5 of their 
population living and poverty are categorized as 4.  Table 16 shows the distribution of 
Mexican states according to its poverty category.  
To ensure the correct estimation of models since very beginning, I added the fixed 
effect component to models (4) and (5). The new baseline control model is as follows: 
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(6)   
 
Where R is a dummy system indicating regional poverty level and the rest of the variables 
are defined as in model (4). 
Table 16: Percentage of 
Mexican states living under 
the line of poverty 
State   Poverty Category 
Nuevo León   1 
Coahuila  1 Distrito Federal  1 Baja California Sur  1 Baja California  1 Sonora  1 Quintana Roo  1 Colima  1 Sinaloa  2 Jalisco  2 Aguascalientes  2 Chihuahua  2 Tamaulipas  2 Nayarit  2 Querétaro  2 México  2 Morelos  3 Yucatán  3 Guanajuato  3 Campeche  3 Durango  3 San Luis Potosí  3 Hidalgo  3 Michoacán  3 Tabasco  4 Veracruz  4 Zacatecas  4 Tlaxcala  4 Puebla  4 Oaxaca  4 Guerrero  4 Chiapas   4 
 
 
MATHij = β0 +β1 Pr ivatej +β2 Propensity+ β3
i=1
∑ PEij + βc
c=1
R
∑ Ri +εij
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And the new identification model for school factors is: 
(7)   
MATHij = β0 +β1 Pr ivatej +β2 Propensity+ β3
i=1
∑ PEij + β3
i=1
∑ PhysRe s+
β3
i=1
∑ SchMng+ β3
i=1
∑ TQ+ β3
i=1
∑ TpractCOijij + βc
c=1
R
∑ Ri +εij
 
 
with the inclusion as well of R as a dummy system indicating regional poverty level and 
the rest of the variables defined as before. 
Models (6) and (7) are the ones that are going to be estimated to answer my 
second research question. Fixed effects are going to be “absorbed”, in the sense that they 
will be taken into account for the estimation of all variables in the model, but are not 
going to be reported, since they are not really an interest of this research.  
 
5.2 Measures and Descriptive Statistics. 
5.2.1 Measures 
5.2.1.1 Baseline Control Model Variables 
Propensity-Score Variable. This variable represents the conditional probability of 
getting into a private school after fitting model (6). Values can range from 0 to 1.  
Peer-group composition.  To describe peer group composition, I created nine 
variables, divided in two groups: Family Expectations and Socio-Economic Status.  
Family Expectations and Educational Interests is measured by three variables: the 
percentage of students in the school whose educational expectation is to attain a 
bachelor’s degree or a graduate education (STUDENTEXP_CLASSPER); the percentage 
of students in the school whose parents expect them to attain either a bachelor’s or a 
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graduate education (PARENTALEXP_CLASSPER); the average score in the index 
PARENTALINT index of the students in the school (PARENTALINT_CLASSPER). It 
is important to point out that some of the variable within this group are in fact indirect 
measures of peer-group. This is the case of the variable measuring student’s parental 
expectations and parental interests (PARENTALEXP_CLASSPER and 
PARENTALINT_CLASSPER). These measures are quite different from the more 
common measures used in the literature, such as average achievement or racial 
composition of the school. Nonetheless, I decided to include them in the following 
analyses because I believe they reflect important differences about the student body that 
are part of public and private schools. However, interpretation about the weight of these 
variables in the statistical models should be taken with caution.  
Socio-Economic Status is measured by four variables: the percentage of students 
in the school whose family receive medical attention either at the IMSS, ISSSTE or 
similar institutions, or go to private clinics and private health services 
(HEALTHSERV_CLASSPER); the percentage of students within the school that work 
besides studying (WORK_CLASSPER); the percentage of students within the school that 
have a computer at home (COMPUTER_CLASSPER); and the percentage of students 
within the school that have a car at home (CAR_CLASSPER).  
Finally, Family Cultural Capital is measured by two variables: the percentage of 
students in the school that have 100 or more books at home (BOOKS_CLASSPER); and 
the percentage of students in the school whose mother’s maximum level of schooling is 
college or beyond (MOTHSCH_CLASSPER). 
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5.2.1.2 Question Predictors  
School- physical resources. To record school physical resources, I am using four 
variables. The infrastructure of the school is measured by an index of School Physical 
Resources (SCHOOLPHYSRES) constructed from information about the availability and 
conditions of basic infrastructural resources, such as student bathrooms, sports facilities, 
all-purpose room, backyard, library, and media center. The school pedagogical resources 
is measured by two indexes, School Pedagogical Resources (SCHOOLPEDRES) and 
School Computer Resources (SCHOOLCOMPRES), which combined measured the 
existence and number of certain basic teaching resources, such as stereo or recorder, dvd 
player, television, computer, computer projector, etc. All indexes have a mean of 0 and an 
sd of 1. The fourth variables is a set of dummy variables measuring the number of books 
available at the school (SCHOOLBOOKS1-SCHOOLBOOKS4), from 100 or less to 
more than 400 books. The omitted category is SCHOOLBOOKS1. 
School Management.  To measure school management, I created four variables: 
an index of Principal Support (PRINCIPALSUPP), which measures the extent to which 
the school principal provides support and guidance to the teacher; an index of Teacher 
Collaborative Work (TEACHCOLLWORK), which assess the quality of the relationship 
of the teacher with his or her colleagues at the school, especially the quality of the 
communication among them, the level of support he or she receives from them, and the 
team work. The two other variables are in fact two sets of dummy variables: one set of 
dummy variables measures indicate the number of classes cancelled during the academic 
year at the school for any reason (CLASSLOSS0-CLASSLOSS4), anything from the 
schedule of teaching meetings to the occurrence of teaching strikes. The omitted category 
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is CLASSLOSS0. The second set of dummy variables measure the actual length of the 
school day in terms of hours, which can go from 4.5 hours or less (SCHOOLDAYHRS1) 
to 6.5 hours or more (SCHOOLDAYHRS3). The omitted category is 
SCHOOLDAYHRS1 
Teacher quality.  To record teacher quality, I am including two groups of dummy 
variables. Teacher education is measured by a vector of dummy variables, TCHEDU1B 
through TCHEDU5G, ranging from “high school or less” to “graduate school”. My 
omitted category is TCHEDU1B.  I am measuring Teacher Experience by a group of 
dummy variables indicating the number of years the teacher has worked in the profession, 
from two or less years of experience to 16 or more years (TEACHEXP1- TEACHEXP4). 
The omitted category is TEACHEXP1. 
Teaching Practices and Classroom Organization. I am including six groups of 
variables to measuring teaching practices and classroom organization. I measure 
Curriculum Coverage using a set of four dummy variables (CURRICOVERAGE1 to 
CURRICUVOERAGE4), measuring the amount of curriculum the teacher expects to 
cover during the academic year (from 50% or less of the academic curriculum to 100%). 
The omitted category is CURRICOVERGE1. To measure the actual practices of teachers 
in the school, I created four indexes that convey the level to which teachers include good 
teaching techniques in their regular practice and in the teaching of Spanish and 
Mathematics. The Good Pedagogy Index (GOODPEDAGOGY) encompasses the 
frequency in which teachers practice sound general pedagogical practices, such as 
explaining students how to correct their mistakes, use pedagogical resources other than 
the blackboard, allow the students to express their opinions, or teach the students how to 
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investigate. There are two Math Pedagogy indexes (MATHPED and 
MATHPEDRSCOLLWK), indicate the frequency in which the teachers engage in 
pedagogical practices that have proved to be related to better student learning in 
Mathematics. Finally, I am including in the analyses a set of dummy variables measuring 
student-teacher ratio (STDTEACHRATIO1-STDTEACHRATIO4), which can go from 
“less than 15 students in the classroom” to “41 or more students in the classroom”. The 
omitted category is STDTEACHRATIO1.   
 
5.2.2 Descriptive Statistics: Public and Private Schools 
5.2.2.1 Peer Group Composition 
The difference in peer-group composition between public and private schools are 
substantial, which means that a student attending a private school interacts with a student 
body of better quality that the one he or she can be in contact with in a public school. 
Table 17 presents the main differences in peer group composition variables. 
In terms of student expectations, 90.6 percent of the students in private schools 
expect that in the future they will attain a college education or more, whereas only 65.5% 
of students in public schools expect to reach that academic level. The same happens with 
parental expectations. In private schools, 26.6 percent more parents than in public 
schools, expect higher levels of education from their children. In addition to that, the 
average score in the Parental Interest Index for public school is -0.02 versus the 0.27 
score of private school, which is a little more that a quarter of a standard deviation, 
showing that students who attend private schools are more likely to interact with other 
children whose parents tend to be more interested in the education of their children than 
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public student’s parents, which would very likely translate in an advantageous 
educational environment for them. 
As expected, there are also marked differences in the SES of students attending 
urban public schools and those attending private schools. In private schools, 74.70% of 
students have access to either public or private health services, whereas only 37.19% of 
students in public school do. In addition to that, public schools have a proportion of 
students who have computer at home more than twice as large as the corresponding 
proportion in public schools.  
 
Table 17: Mean values for variables measuring Peer-Group Composition 
by Type of School  
 School Type 
Variables Urban Public Private 
   
Family Expectations and Educational Interests 
Percentage of Students in the school that their educational 
expectation is to attain a bachelor’s degree or a graduate 
education (Studentexp_classper) 
 
65.55 
 
90.66 
   
Percentage of students in the school whose parents expect 
them to attain either a bachelor’s or a graduate education 
(Parentalexp_classper) 
 
58.00 
 
83.64 
   
Average score in the index Parentalint of the students in the 
school (Parentalint_classper) 
 
-0.02 
 
0.27 
   
Socio-Economic Status 
Percentage of students in the school whose family receive 
medical attention either at the IMSS, ISSSTE or similar 
institutions, or go to private clinics and private health 
services (Healthserv_classper) 
 
37.19 
 
74.70 
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…Continuation Table 17 
 School Type 
Variables Urban Public Private 
   
Percentage of students within the school that work besides 
studying. (Work_classper) 
18.36 12.09 
   
Percentage of students within the school that have a 
computer at home (Computer_classper) 
 
36.24 
 
86.67 
   
Percentage of students within the school that have a car at 
home (Car_classper) 
58.32 91.75 
   
Percentage of students in the school that have 100 or more 
books at home (Books_classper) 
 
15.09 
 
37.48 
   
Percentage of students in the school whose mother’s 
maximum level of schooling is college or beyond 
(Mothsch_classper) 
 
9.28 
 
51.86 
 
 
Also, in private schools, on average, about 91.75% of students have cars, whereas 
in public schools that figure is only 58.32 percent. In terms of the percentage of students 
within the school that work besides studying, the difference between both types of school 
is only 6 percentage points. Also, in private schools, the percentage of students who have 
100 books or more at home are 37.48 percent, more than double the figure of students 
who have those books in public schools (15.09%). In addition to that, half of the mothers 
of students in private schools have a college education or beyond, whereas only 9.28 
percent of mothers with students in public schools have that level of education. 
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5.2.2.2 Predictor Variables 
With respect to school characteristics, there are important differences between 
public and private schools in the four factors that are hypothesized to explain the public-
private achievement differential: school’s physical resources, school management, 
teacher quality, and teaching practices and classroom organization. In this section I 
present the basic descriptive statistics and discuss the most important differences. 
 Table 18 shows the mean values for variables measuring School Resources.  
 
Table 18: Mean values for variables measuring School Resource by Types 
of School 
  School Type 
 
 Urban 
Public Private 
 
School Physical Resources 
School Physical Resources Index (Schoolphysres) -.2397 1.460 
 
School Pedagogical Resources 
School Pedagogical Resources Index (Schoolpedres) -.1274 1.022 
School Computer Resources Index (Schoolcompres) -.1027 .1103 
   
Availability of Books at School Dummy System   
Schoolbooks1 = there are less than 100 books in the 
school 
.10 .17 
Schoolbooks2 = if there are between 100 and 200 
books in the school 
.15 .19 
Schoolbooks3 = if there are between 200 and 400 
books in the school 
.25 .21 
Schoolbooks4 = if there are more than 400 books in 
the school 
.49 .43 
 
 
It is clear that with the exception of the number of books available at the school, 
private school tend to be, on average, considerably more equipped than public schools in 
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terms of infrastructure and pedagogical resources. Private schools scored, on average, 1.6 
standard deviations more than their public counterparts in the physical resources index, 
which convey the availability of resources such as bathroom, sport facilities, library, and 
the like. Private schools also scored a little more than one standard deviation more than 
public schools in the pedagogical resources index, which means that private schools have 
on average considerable more pedagogical resources, such as computer projectors, 
television, and video recorder. In term of computer resources, private schools scored 20% 
of one standard deviation above public schools in the School Computer Resources Index. 
In terms of number of books available at the school, public schools are more equipped 
than private schools. In 49% of the public schools, the school principals informed that 
there were more than 400 books in the school, versus 43 percent of principals in private 
schools informing the same figure of books. 
In terms of school management, Table 19 presents the descriptive statistics for the 
respective variables. There are some important differences in terms of the pedagogical 
environment and the general opportunities to learn available to students at public and 
private schools school. These features of the school management are typically regulated, 
or at least highly influenced, by school principals. The average value of the Principal 
Support Index is -0.13 for public schools, and 0.37 points for private schools. Since the 
index has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1, this means that the difference in the 
Principal Support Index between these two types of schools is half of one standard 
deviation. 
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Table 19: Mean values for variables measuring School Management by Type 
of School 
 School Type 
Variables Urban Public Private 
   Teacher Collaborative Work 
Principalsupp = Principal Support Index -0.13 0.37 
Teachcollwork = Teacher Collaborative Work 
Index 
-0.14 0.32 
Curriculum Exposure 
Number of Class Days Lost in the Year Dummy 
System 
  
Classloss0 = There were no cancelled school days 
in the school year 
0.10 0.30 
Classloss1 = There were 5 or less cancelled school 
days in the school year 
0.20 0.14 
Classloss2 = There were between 6 and 10 
cancelled school days in the school year 
0.34 0.34 
Classloss3 = There were between 11 and 20 
cancelled school days in the school year 
0.24 0.18 
Classloss4 = There were more than 20 cancelled 
school days in the school year 
0.11 0.05 
 
  
Length of School day Dummy System 
(Schooldayhrs1- Schooldayhrs3) 
  
Schooldayhrs1 = The regular school day last 4.5 
hours or less 
0.37 0.01 
Schooldayhrs2 = The regular school day last 
between 5 and 6 hours 
0.61 0.62 
Schooldayhrs3 = The regular school day last 6.5 
hours or more 
0.02 0.37 
 
Therefore, the kind of support the teacher can receive in private school serving the 
poor is considerably higher than the one the teachers receive in public schools. 
Something similar happens with respect to the Teacher Collaborative Work Index, where 
there is a distance of almost half of a standard deviation in the index (an average -0.14 
points for public schools and an average of 0.32 points for private schools), which clearly 
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indicates that teachers in private school can draw more support and collaboration from 
their peers than their counterparts in public schools. 
With respect to the management factors that determine the level of curriculum 
exposure that the students have at the school, there are also some drastic differences 
between the public and private schools. There are considerably more cancelled days in 
public schools than in private schools: 30 percent of the private school teachers that are 
part of this study indicated that there were no cancelled days in their schools during the 
year, compared with only 10 percent of the teachers in public schools. In addition to that, 
there were only 5 percent of teachers in private schools that informed that there were 20 
or more cancelled days in the school year, against 11 percent of teachers in public schools 
who stated the same. This means that, from the basic perspective of the actual number of 
days that the students spend at school, private schools offer over the course of an 
academic year several more days of schooling.  But not only that, there are also 
differences in the length of the school day between both types of schools. There are 37 
percent of teachers who stated than in their public schools, the regular school lasted 4.5 
hours or less, versus 1 percent of teachers in the private schools who informed that the 
school day lasted only that long. On the other side of the continuum, 37 percent of private 
schools appear to have school days that last 6.5 hours or more, versus only 2 percent of 
public schools with school days that long. Therefore, it seems that students have more 
opportunity to learn in private school than in public schools. 
In terms of teacher quality, as in this case, is commonly measured with indicator 
of teacher education and teacher experience, there does not seem to be great differences 
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between public and private school teachers. Table 20 conveys the mean value for the two 
system of variables used to measure teacher education and teacher experience.  
Table 20: Mean values for variables measuring Teacher Quality by Type of 
School 
 School Type 
Variables Urban Public Private 
   
Teacher Education Dummy System   
Teachedu1b   = Teacher education is high school or 
technical education 
0.00 0.03 
Teachedu 2n  = Teacher education is “normal basica” 0.27 0.20 
Teachedu 3ns = Teacher education is “normal superior” 
or college 
0.61 0.57 
Teachedu 4ol = Teacher education is non-educational 
bachelor 
0.04 0.12 
Teachedu 5g  = Teacher education is graduate education 0.07 0.07 
   Teacher Experience Dummy System   
Teachexp1 = Teacher has two or less years of experience 0.08 0.10 
Teachexp2 = Teacher has between 3 and 10 years of 
experience 
0.23 0.39 
Teachexp3 = Teacher has between 11 and 15 years of 
experience 
0.09 0.17 
Teachexp4 = Teacher has 16 or more years of experience 0.60 0.33 
 
There are only small differences in the amount of education teachers have 
between these two types of schools, although in terms of experience, the teachers with 
more experience actually work in public schools. It is very likely that this is due to the 
fact that the public education system is much older and offers tenure to teachers, and that 
until very recent there were no private schools affordable to the poor in Mexico.  
In terms of teacher practices and classroom organization it is clear that there are 
very different teaching dynamics going on in the classroom of public and private schools. 
Table 21 presents the mean value for all variables within this category.  
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Table 21: Mean values for variables measuring Teaching Practices and 
Classroom Organization by Type of School 
 School Type 
Variables Urban Public Private 
   
Good Pedagogy Index (Goodpedagogy) -0.0735 0.3759 
Math Pedagogy Index (Mathped) -0.1032 0.3934 
Math Pedagogy Resource and Collaborative Work 
Index (Mathpedrscollwk) 
0.0507 -0.4905 
   Amount of Curriculum Covered in the Academic Year 
Dummy System 
Curricoverage1 = The curriculum’s coverage was 50% 
or less 
0.01 0.00 
Curricoverage2 = The curriculum’s coverage was 60 to 
70% 
0.14 0.03 
Curricoverage3 = The curriculum’s coverage was 80% 0.48 0.19 
Curricoverage4 = The curriculum’s coverage was 90 to 
100% 
0.37 0.78 
   
Student - Teacher Ration   
Stdteachratio1 = Less than 15 students 0.05 0.19 
Stdteachratio2 = Between 16 and 25 students 0.37 0.36 
Stdteachratio3 = Between 26 and 40 students 0.54 0.35 
Stdteachratio4 = 41 or more students 0.04 0.09 
 
Although there were only small differences in Teacher Quality (education and 
experience) between public and private schools, there seem to be very large differences in 
terms of “teaching quality” between the two types of schools, which is referred to the 
quality of the actual teaching going on in the classroom. In the Good Pedagogy Index, 
teacher in private schools average almost 40 points more than teachers in private schools 
(40% of one standard deviation in the index). This means that when it comes to applying 
general good pedagogy practices, such as how to correct their students’ mistakes or allow 
students to express their opinions, the educational practices of teachers in private schools 
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are of more quality than those of public school teachers. This is true despite the fact that 
there does not seems to be a difference between both types of teachers in terms of 
education, or the fact public school teachers have on average more teaching experience.  
A similar trend can be found by comparing the average results of Mathematics 
Pedagogy Index, the difference between public and private school teacher is even larger: 
half of one standard deviation in the Math Pedagogy Index. Therefore, poor students in 
private school are more likely to learn in a classroom where teachers put to practice more 
appropriate pedagogical techniques for the learning of Mathematics.  
It is also clear, that in addition to be exposed to better teaching practices, students 
in private schools have more opportunity to learn than students in public schools. In 
private schools, 78 percent of the teachers considered that the in their classrooms the 6th 
grade curriculum would be covered between 90% and 100% in the academic year. In 
public schools, that figure is only 37 percent. Therefore, students in private school seem 
to be exposed to a greater proportion of the 6th grade curriculum. Considering that, as 
discussed above, the indicators of teaching quality are also considerably higher in private 
schools, poor students in these schools are exposed to almost the entire the 6th grade 
curriculum, which is also delivered to them with better teaching quality.  
In addition to differences in the actual teaching practices taking place in public 
and private schools, private schools also offer, on average, a smaller class size than public 
schools. In private schools, 55% of classes have less than 25 students, where in public 
schools this figure is 42%.  
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5.3 Empirical Results 
5.3.1 Baseline Control Model and the Private School Differential 
 I fitted a group of nested regression models to control the effects in student 
achievement in Mathematics of background variables and peer group composition. In this 
way, the remaining effect of Private School would reflect the effect of the differentiated 
school factors focus of this research, net of any personal characteristics or peer-group 
effect. Table 22 presents the results.  
 Model 0 shows the raw effect of Private School in achievement in mathematics. 
Without taking into consideration any other factor, attending a private school is 
associated to an average difference of almost 80% of a standard deviation of the 
mathematics test. However, as it was largely discussed while answering to my first 
research question, this raw comparison between public and private school is biased and 
should not be considered for any practical purpose.  
 Model 1 controls for self-selection into private school and, therefore, the 
magnitude and direction of the coefficient that conveys the private school effect is close 
to the earlier estimations for my first research question. On the other hand, it is also clear 
that if I add to Model 0 the variables controlling for school peer-group composition, the 
perspective is also very different. Model 2 shows that once I control for peer-group 
variables, the Private School effect goes down to 24.29 test points only. Moreover, when 
I included in the model both the Propensity Score variable and the peer group variables, 
the Private School effect is only 19.68 points.  
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Table 22: Series of Nested Regression Models aimed at building a Control 
Model to estimate the effect of Private School on student achievement in 
Mathematics, controlling for Self Selection into Education Sector (Propensity 
Score) and Peer Group Effects, with poverty region fixed effects. 
Variables Model 0   Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   
  (N=3,311)   (N=2,954)   (N=3,311)   (N=2,954)   
         Private School 78.13 **** 42.53 **** 24.29 **** 19.68 ** 
         Propensity Score 
  
89.07 **** 
  
48.54 **** 
         Peer Group Effects 
        % Students expectation of 
bachelor’s degree 
    
-0.25 
 
-0.18 
 % Parental expectation of 
bachelor’s degree 
    
0.76 **** 0.72 **** 
Average of Parental Interest 
Index 
    
26.31 **** 28.66 **** 
% Students with medical 
attention 
    
0.14 
 
0.09 
 % Students that works 
    
-0.83 **** -0.80 **** 
% Students with computer at 
home 
    
-0.09 
 
-0.06 
 % Student with car at home 
    
0.21 ** 0.13 
 % Students with 100 books at 
home 
    
-0.23 
 
-0.32 * 
% Students with mother with 
college degree 
    
0.66 **** 0.39 ** 
         Constant 493.29 **** 489.07 **** 464.63 **** 469.05 **** 
R-squared 0.069   0.091   0.137   0.142   
       *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 ****p<.001 
 
 This means that the private school effect in the mathematic achievement of poor 
students that can be theoretically attributed to differences in the school inputs studied in 
this research is only a fifth of a standard deviation in the Mathematics test. This means 
that out of the original Private School Effect of 42.53 points, reported in Model 1, 22.85 
points (or 54% of this original effect) is attributable, on average, to the quality of the peer 
group that the student has the opportunity to interact with at the private school. This is a 
very important effect, which is consistent to other findings in the literature (Harris, 2010). 
The fact that peer group composition has not been the object of any public educational 
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policy in Mexico does not change the fact that peer group effects alone account for little 
over half the private school advantage, once student background is taking into account. It 
is worth noticing that recent literature has challenged the idea that race, ethnicity or even 
income (which is proxied in this dissertation’s analyses) have any substantial effect on 
achievement once researchers properly account for peer’s achievement (Hoxby & 
Weingarth, 2005). I do not have available measures of peer’s achievement or even direct 
measures of income to properly address this argument. Therefore, this finding is not 
robust and should not be taken at face value.  
 The variables accounting for peer-group composition are statistically significant 
and bear much weight in academic achievement. For example, a standard deviation 
difference in the index that conveys the level of parental interest in the education of their 
children is associated to an average of 28.66 test points in mathematics, which is more 
than a quarter of a standard deviation in the mathematics test. Almost all variables that 
reflect peer-group composition are statistically significant and are of considerable 
magnitude.  
As stated earlier, peer-group composition has not really be the subject of public 
policy in Mexico, at least not at large scale, and therefore I decided to include it in the 
control model to control its effect and be able in that way to identify the effects of school 
inputs subject of modification through policy change.  
From the perspective of a parent who is choosing a school that best serves his or 
her child, it may not matter whether a private school is better for their child because it 
possesses good teachers and strong curricula of because it attracts students who form an 
academically supportive peer group.  However, from the perspective of public policy 
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makers, it does matter.  The reason is that not all schools can serve students from families 
that provide “above-average” support for academic achievement. Therefore, if it is true 
that peer group composition is relevant to student achievement, it is also true that it is a 
resource that is scarce, and policy makers need to take this into account. The potential 
benefits of peers might vanish as the number of private school increases. Nonetheless, 
public policy could limit the extent to which schools segregate students into homogenous 
groups. This has happened in fact in Chile, where over the last few years there have been 
intentional attempts to prevent schools from segregating students through policy 
(Valenzuela, Bellei, & de los Ríos, 2013). 
 
5.3.2 The Role of School Factors in Explaining the Private School Advantage in 
Mathematics  
 I introduced in the baseline model the variables related to school physical 
resources and school management. Table 23 shows the results. Model 4 shows that once 
the variables related to school physical resources are taken into account in the model, in 
addition to the variables included in the baseline model, the private school effect 
diminishes even further from the effect depicted in Model 3 (19.68 points). Now the 
achievement differential attributed to being enrolled in a poor school is, on average, only 
17.86 test points. On the other hand, school management also seems to diminish the 
effect of attending a private school even a little more. Model 5 shows that taking into 
account differences in school management decreases the effect of private school, on 
average, to 15.27 tests points (15% of a standard deviation). In addition to that, the 
private school effect is now barely significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Table 23: Series of Regression Models that Predict the Effect of Private 
School on student achievement in Mathematics, controlling for the effect of 
Physical Resources and School Management, and the variables included in 
the Control Model, with poverty region fixed effects. 
Variables Model 4   Model 5   
  (N=2,676)   (N=2,837)   
     Private School 17.86 ** 15.27 * 
School Physical Resources 
    School Physical Resources Index 3.57 
   School Pedagogical Resources Index 1.73 
   School Computer Resources Index -1.34 
        Availability of Books at School 
    Between 100 and 200 books -12.58 
   Between 200 and 400 books 3.36 * 
  More 400 books 1.58 
   School Management 
    Principal Support Index 
  
1.28 
 Teacher Collaborative Work Index 
  
-1.18 
      Number of Class Days Lost 
    5 or Less 
  
-2.02 
 Between 6 and 10 
  
-8.99 
 Between 11 and 20 
  
-6.67 
 More than 20 
  
-8.37 
      Length of School Day 
    Between 5 and 5 hours 
  
2.21 
 6.5 hours or more 
  
16.19 * 
CONTROL MODEL 
Propensity Score 45.76 **** 50.55 **** 
Peer Group Effects 
    % Students expectation of bachelor’s degree -0.11 
 
-0.14 
 % Parental expectation of bachelor’s degree 0.62 **** 0.67 **** 
Average of Parental Interest Index 25.91 **** 27.23 **** 
% Students with medical attention 0.14 
 
0.11 
 % Students that works -0.82 **** -0.77 **** 
% Students with computer at home -0.09 
 
-0.08 
 % Student with car at home 0.07 
 
0.15 
 % Students with 100 books at home -0.36 ** -0.29 * 
% Students with mother with college degree 0.40 ** 0.36 ** 
Constant 474.98 **** 471.30 **** 
R-squared 0.147   0.150   
         *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 ****p<.001 
 In Table 24 I show the private school effect on student achievement on 
mathematics after introducing into the baseline model the last two school factors: teacher 
quality (Model 6) and teaching practices and classroom organization (Model 7). 
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Table 24: Series of Regression Models that Predict the Effect of Private School on 
student achievement in Mathematics, controlling for the effect of Teacher Quality 
and Teaching Practices and Classroom Organization, and the variables included 
in the Control Model, with poverty region fixed effects. 
Variables Model 6   Model 7   
  (N=2,923)   (N=2,746)   
Private School 19.46 ** 26.97 *** 
Teacher Quality 
         Teacher Education 
    “Normal Basica” -47.19 ** 
  College -40.30 ** 
  Non-educational Bachelor -45.40 ** 
  Graduate School -43.56 ** 
       Teacher Experience 
    Between 3 and 10 years 1.41 
   Between 11 and 15 years -4.87 
   16 or more years 3.45 
   Teaching Practices and Classroom Organization 
         Curriculum Coverage 
      60% to 70% 
  
28.48 
   80% 
  
24.05 
   90% to 100% 
  
31.06 * 
Good Pedagogy Index 
  
16.76 **** 
Math Pedagogy Index 
  
2.20 
 Math Pedagogy Resource Index 
  
5.54 **** 
     Student-Teacher Ratio 
    Between 16 and 25 students 
  
5.30 
 Between 26 and 40 students 
  
15.68 ** 
41 or more students 
  
6.17 
 CONTROL MODEL 
Propensity Score 47.57 **** 44.77 **** 
Peer Group Effects 
    % Students expectation of bachelor’s degree -0.17 
 
-0.28 
 % Parental expectation of bachelor’s degree 0.72 **** 0.69 **** 
Average of Parental Interest Index 29.10 **** 20.73 *** 
% Students with medical attention 0.10 
 
0.04 
 % Students that works -0.74 **** -0.75 **** 
% Students with computer at home -0.08 
 
-0.11 
 % Student with car at home 0.15 
 
0.11 
 % Students with 100 books at home -0.30 * -0.38 ** 
% Students with mother with college degree 0.39 ** 0.39 ** 
Constant 507.33 **** 445.40 **** 
R-squared 0.145   0.187   
               *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 ****p<.001 
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Teacher quality, as measured by teacher education and teacher experience, does 
not explain any part of the private school advantage. The coefficient of private school in 
Model 6 is 19.46 test points, practically the same than what it was in the baseline model 
(19.68 test points). Although there is an effect of teacher quality in student achievement, 
this effect does not seem to be a differentiated effect linked to private schooling.  
On the other hand, once I added to the baseline control model, the group of 
variables associated to teacher practices and classroom organization, the effect of private 
actually increased. It went from 19.68 test points (Model 3) to 26.97 test points (Model 
7), a little more than a quarter of a standard deviation, accentuating in this way the private 
school effect. 
5.3.3 Results and Discussion: The Combined Effect of School Factors and the 
Private School Effect 
 It is important to assess how these school factors behave together in the same 
model and if in that case, there is still a private school effect left that remain unexplained. 
Table 25 reports the final model. 
After taking into consideration the baseline control model, and the variables 
associated to physical resources, school management, teacher quality, and teaching 
practices and classroom organization, the differentiated effect of private school became 
small and not significant. This means that, as originally hypothesized, the private school 
effect, net of family background and peer-group effects, reported in Model 3, were 
explained away by the school factors included in the final model.  
In other words, there is no remaining private school advantage in mathematics for 
the poor if differences between public and private school in the educational factors 
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considered in this research are resolved, net of peer-group effects. According to findings 
reported in section 5.3.1, the peer-group effects were very large; they accounted for about 
half of the private school advantage. The rest of the school inputs together, account for 
the rest of the private school advantage. 
Table 25: Final Models estimated to predict the effect of Private School on 
student achievement in Mathematics, controlling for the effect of physical 
resources, school management, teacher quality, and teaching practices and 
classroom organization, with poverty region fixed effects.  
Variables Model 8 
(N=2,391)   
   Private School 16.92 
 School Physical Resources 
  School Physical Resources Index 4.35 * 
School Pedagogical Resources Index 0.02 
 School Computer Resources Index -0.46 
      Availability of Books at School 
  Between 100 and 200 books -11.36 
 Between 200 and 400 books 3.84 
 More 400 books -0.10 
 School Management 
  Principal Support Index -0.62 
 Teacher Collaborative Work Index -0.61 
      Number of Class Days Lost 
  5 or Less -2.65 
 Between 6 and 10 -8.26 
 Between 11 and 20 -3.12 
 More than 20 -6.08 
      Length of School Day 
  Between 5 and 5 hours 5.01 
 6.5 hours or more 19.82 ** 
Teacher Quality 
       Teacher Education 
  “Normal Basica” -44.01 ** 
College -41.88 ** 
Non-educational Bachelor -51.03 ** 
Graduate School -45.35 ** 
*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 ****p<.001 
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…Continuation Table 25 
Variables Model 8   
  (N=2,391)   
     Teacher Experience 
  Between 3 and 10 years 3.00 
 Between 11 and 15 years -0.12 
 16 or more years 1.66   
 
Teaching Practices and Classroom 
Organization 
       Curriculum Coverage 
    60% to 70% 23.22 
   80% 16.55 
   90% to 100% 24.23 
 Good Pedagogy Index 16.97 **** 
Math Pedagogy Index 2.72 
 Math Pedagogy Resource Index 6.25 **** 
     Student-Teacher Ratio 
  Between 16 and 25 students 7.02 
 Between 26 and 40 students 17.55 ** 
41 or more students 7.83 
 CONTROL MODEL 
Propensity Score 43.59 **** 
Peer Group Effects 
  % Students expectation of bachelor’s degree -0.17 
 % Parental expectation of bachelor’s degree 0.57 *** 
Average of Parental Interest Index 19.27 *** 
% Students with medical attention 0.08 
 % Students that works -0.66 **** 
% Students with computer at home -0.14 
 % Student with car at home 0.11 
 % Students with 100 books at home -0.40 ** 
% Students with mother with college degree 0.40 ** 
Constant 493.17 ** 
R-squared 0.203   
*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 ****p<.001 
 
Of some importance is to analyze the individual effect that each school factor has 
in mathematics achievement. This exercise would help us understand the factors 
associated to the academic performance of the poor, information that can be of use for 
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policy analysis and for the understanding of academic achievement at the end of Mexican 
SES distribution. This particular analysis will also shed light into the means that help 
private schools make a difference for the achievement of the poor. 
First, according to Model 8, only one of the indexes that account for the effect of 
the school physical resource in achievement is barely statistically significant, controlling 
for all other variables included in the model. A one standard deviation increase in the 
index of physical resources is only associated to an average increase of 4.35 test points in 
Mathematic. This seems to be consistent with the literature that tends to confirm that 
physical resources contribution to achievement in general is marginal. School 
pedagogical resources and school computer resources do not seem to have any impact at 
all. The dummy system of books availability, a proxy for other pedagogical resources, is 
also not significant.  
 In terms of school management, the environment and educational setting created 
in the school by the principal seem to be only of relative importance. The support the 
teachers receive from the principal and the amount of collaboration they receive from 
their peers does not seem to be a factor in student achievement. The Principal Support 
Index and the Teacher Collaborative Work Index are not statistically significant in Model 
8. The same happens with the number of class days lost during the academic year. The 
entire dummy system reflecting this factor is not statistically significant. On the other 
hand, the length of the school day bears some weight on student mathematic 
achievement. On average, students who attend schools with shifts of 6.5 hours or more, 
tend to outperform their peers, all things being equal, by almost a fifth of a standard 
deviation.  
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 Teacher quality (understood as the level of teacher education and experience) 
presents very mixed results. This is consistent with the literature review: in general, 
teacher quality does not seem to provide a clear pattern of influence into educational 
achievement. For example, with respect to teacher education, the analysis produced 
counter-intuitive results. Having teachers with more education seems to be, on average, 
negatively associated to student achievement. This is true to the extent that having 
teachers in the school with graduate studies is associated with a decrease in Mathematics 
test of 45 points on average, only 5 points short of half of a standard deviation in the 
mathematics test. Evidently, this does not imply that more education actually hurts 
student achievement. It is clear that this variable is picking up other associated effects. 
For example, the vast majority of more educated and experience teachers –measured in a 
traditional way- tend to work in the Public education system. Therefore, is quite possible 
that Teacher Education is picking up other non-measured factors of the public education 
system. It is clear, that in particular with this subject matter, there are some negative 
correlation between the education of the teachers and other school factors that are 
affecting achievement negatively. 
 With respect to the teaching practices and classroom organization, the quality of 
pedagogy practiced in the classroom is of the highest importance. The Good Pedagogy 
Index is positively associated with achievement. An increase of one standard deviation in 
this index is associated with an average increase of 17 points in Mathematics. However, 
out of the two indexes that reflect the quality of pedagogy in mathematics, one is not 
statistically significant (Math Pedagogy Index) and the other –Math Pedagogy Resource 
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Index- has only a marginal effect: a difference of 6.25 points for a difference of 1 
standard deviation in the index.  
On the other hand, student-teacher ratio presents contradictory results. According 
to Model 8, students who attend a classroom that have between 26 and 40 students, as 
opposed to less than 15 students, tend to perform better, on average, by almost 18 test 
points.  
There is no clear explanation in the context of this research that would explain 
why students learn better in a larger classroom. Considering that most larger classroom 
are actually in public schools, it is my contention that the student-teacher ratio variables 
is picking some other effect that is going on in the public schools. For example, is very 
likely that more capable teachers are actually placed in larger classrooms, this would 
explain the achievement premium associated to larger groups. This is a hypothesis that 
should be tested in future studies.  
 Finally, one important thing to keep in mind is the fact that some of the proxies of 
quality and pedagogy used in these analyses are rather crude, and they probably fail to 
capture very important aspects of teacher quality. For instance, teacher education and 
qualifications fail to account for the wide variation in quality among the different 
institutions where teachers are educated. In other words, before drawing definitive 
conclusions about the role that teacher quality, teaching practices, and classroom 
organization have on explaining the private school advantage, more research with better 
specification of these variables should be conducted. 
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6. Conclusions 
Mexico is a country where there are no policies to promote enrollment in private 
schools, either on the demand-side or on the supply-side of the market. Nonetheless, there 
seem to be indications that at least a proportion of the poor are looking for private 
education alternatives in elementary education. In this dissertation, I used information of 
math achievement from poor students (students beneficiaries of the Oportunidades 
program) attending public and private school participants of the EXCALE06-2009, I 
found that private schools in Mexico offer a clear advantage for poor students in primary 
education. Poor students in private schools outperformed poor public school students by 
48 test points (or 0.48 standard deviations) in Mathematics.  
Descriptive statistics show that students attending private schools are relatively 
more advantaged than those attending public schools, probably as a result of selection 
bias. The private school advantage was therefore identified after successfully correcting 
for selection bias using propensity score matching. The results passed different 
robustness checks: they are robust to the use of different matching estimators, they are 
robust to hidden bias arises from the geographic location of schools, and it has been 
demonstrated that a hidden bias would need to increase the odds of entering into a private 
school by 90% to actually affect the estimation of the private school advantage. 
The 0.48 sd private school effect found in this dissertation is indeed very large 
compared to most of existing literature. These large results might have to do in part with 
the fact that this research is focusing on poor students attending private urban schools, 
which is the right counterfactual to use. Also, large results might be also attributed to the 
fact that all students in the sample attending private schools are all beneficiaries of 
  
115 
Oportunidades, and that some components of Oportundiades might be positively 
interacting with private schooling to produce these large effects. In addition to that, 
exposing poor children to stronger peers seems to contribute in great part to the size of 
the private school effects. 
All of the remaining private school effect is accounted for by identifiable school 
factor, including peer-group composition and the four factors hypothesized in the 
research questions. Once I have taken into account student-self selection into private 
school and peer-group composition (included in the baseline model), and the variables 
associated to physical resources, school management, teacher quality, and teaching 
practices and classroom organization, the differentiated effect of private school became 
small and not significant. This means that all the original effect of studying in a private 
school was captured by actual differences in identifiable school factors, most of which 
have been the focus of educational policy in Mexico in the past years.  
Special consideration should be given to the role of peer-group variables. A very 
important part of the original private school effect (54%) is explained by the peer-group 
composition of private schools. Poor students that attend private schools are exposed to 
peers whose parents are more concerned about their education and, in general, expect 
more about their academic achievement and attainment; their families have more 
education resources, and better socioeconomic status. It is very likely that parents might 
be attracted to private schools so their children are exposed to better peers; an expectation 
that in this situation proved to be supported by the data.  
Nonetheless, some of the variables used to account for peer-group effects are not 
very commonly used in the literature and represent a rather indirect ways to measure peer 
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characteristics. Therefore, this limitation should be taken into account while interpreting 
the results. However, the quality of peer group is a scarce school factor, not easily 
manipulated by public policy and definitely not easy to replicate at a large scale. Also, 
some of the measures used to account for teacher quality and pedagogy in the analyses 
aimed at identifying the determinants of private school advantage, have important 
limitations and, probably, fail to capture very important aspects of these dimensions. 
Results can have important policy implication on all sides of the policy spectrum. 
It can be argued that the difference in serving the poor by private education are so large, 
than rather than dealing with the public school system, financial and pedagogical efforts 
should be directed to facilitate the access of the poor to this kind of school.  On the one 
hand, the main findings of this study show that all of the factors that explain the private 
school differential can be affected by public policy through a variety of programs. 
Therefore, public schools, given the right policies, can do a considerably better job in 
educating the poor than the one they are doing right now.  
This is the first study of its type. It takes advantage of an oversampling of private 
schools in the INEE test exercise and it represents the first attempt at understanding the 
performance of the poor in private schools. Propensity score matching is an identification 
strategy that has limitations. Even though the results hold to different matching algorithm 
and sensitivity bias analyses, the results do not have the benefits of a random experiment 
or other identification strategies that are more robust to hidden bias. The reader must 
exercise caution in drawing policy conclusions from the present research.  
However, this research has identified some potentially important patterns related 
to achievement in private schools.  Further analyses using modern methods for bias 
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reduction, as well as better data sources for studying the effects of school factors, family 
factors and student factors will lead to better understanding of these complicated systems, 
and these studies will help us develop new policies and ideas for improving both public 
and private schools, and ultimately offer better educational opportunities for poor 
children in Mexico. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Description 
 Panel A: Outcome Variable 
MATH Student’s performance in a Math test. 
 Panel B: Propensity Score-Matching Predictors 
Student Characteristics  
FEMALE Dummy variable indicating whether the student is female. 
AGE Student’s age in years. 
PRESCH Dummy variable indicating whether the student went to preschool. 
LANG1-LANG3 Three dummy variables indicating the predominant language spoken at 
home by the student: LANG1 (Spanish), LANG2 (Indigenous), LANG3 
(Other). Omitted category: LANG1.  
Socioeconomic Status  
MOTHSCH1- MOTHSCH6 Seven dummy variables indicating years of schooling of the student’s 
mother, ranging from no formal education at all (MOTHSCH1) to 
graduate studies (MOTHSCH6). Omitted category: MOTHSCH1. 
FATHSCH1- FATHSCH6 Seven dummy variables indicating years of schooling of the student’s 
father, ranging from no formal education at all (FATHSCH1) to graduate 
studies (FATHSCH6). Omitted category: FATHSCH1. 
BOOKS0-BOOKS5 Four dummy variables indicating the number of books available at home 
ranging from none (BOOKS0) to 200 and more (BOOKS4). Omitted 
category: BOOKS0. 
HEALTHSERV0-
HEALTHSERV3 
Four dummy variables indicating family access to health services, 
ranging from no access to any kind of services (HEALTHSERV0) to 
access to private health services (HEALTHSERV3). 
COMPUTER A dummy variable indicating whether there is a computer at home 
CAR A dummy variable indicating whether there is a car at home 
TELEPHONE A dummy variable indicating whether there is telephone at home 
  
 Panel C: Question Predictors 
PRIVATE Dummy variable indicating whether the student attends a private school.  
Physical Resources  
SCHOOLPHYSRES Index measuring the level of physical resources of school. It has mean of 
0 and an sd of 1 
SCHOOLPEDRES Index measuring the pedagogical resources of school. It has mean of 0 
and an sd of 1 
SCHOOLCOMPRES Index measuring the level of computer and electronic resources of school. 
It has mean of 0 and an sd of 1 
SCHOOLBOOKS1-
SCHOOLBOOKS4 
Four dummy variables indicating the number of books available at school 
ranging from 100 or less (SCHOOLBOOKS1) to 400 and more 
(SCHOOLBOOKS4). Omitted category: SCHOOLBOOKS1 
School Management  
PRINCIPALSUPP Index measuring the level to which principal provide support to the 
teachers in the school. It has mean of 0 and an sd of 1 
TEACHCOLLWORK Index measuring the collaborative relationship between teachers in the 
school. It has mean of 0 and an sd of 1 
CLASSLOSS0-
CLASSLOSS4 
System of dummy variables indicating the number of classes cancelled 
during the academic year at the school for any reason, ranging from none 
(CLASSLOSS0) to 20 or more (CLASSLOSS4). 
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…Continuation Table A1 
Variable Description 
 Panel C: Question Predictors 
SCHOOLDAYHRS1- 
SCHOOLDAYHRS3 
System of dummy variables indicating the actual length of the school day 
in terms of hours, which, ranging from 4.5 hours or less 
(SCHOOLDAYHRS1) to 6.5 hours or more (SCHOOLDAYHRS3). The 
omitted category is SCHOOLDAYHRS1 
Teacher Quality  
TCHEDU1B- TCHEDU5G System of dummy variables indicating the educational attainment of the 
student’s teacher, ranging from high school or less (TCHEDU1) to 
graduate studies (TCHEDU5G). The omitted category is TCHEDU1B. 
TEACHEXP1- TEACHEXP4 System of dummy variables indicating the level of educational 
experience of teachers, ranging from two or less (TEACHEXP1) to 16 or 
more (TEACHEXP4). The omitted category is TCHEDU1B. 
Teaching Practices and 
Classroom Organization 
 
CURRICOVERAGE1-
CURRICUVOERAGE4 
System of dummy variables measuring the amount of curriculum the 
teacher expects to cover during the academic year, ranging from 50% or 
less of the academic curriculum (CURRICOVERAGE1) to 100% 
(CURRICUVOERAGE4). The omitted category is 
CURRICUVOERAGE1 
GOODPEDAGOGY Encompasses the frequency in which teachers practice sound general 
pedagogical practices. It has mean of 0 and an sd of 1 
MATHPED Index depicting the frequency in which the teachers engage in 
pedagogical practices that have proved to be related to better student 
learning in Mathematics. It has mean of 0 and an sd of 1 
MATHPEDRSCOLLWK Index depicting the frequency in which the teachers engage in 
pedagogical practices that have proved to be related to better student 
learning in Mathematics. It has mean of 0 and an sd of 1 
STDTEACHRATIO1-
STDTEACHRATIO4 
set of dummy variables measuring student-teacher ratio, ranging from 
“less than 15 students in the classroom” (STDTEACHRATIO1) to “41 or 
more students in the classroom” (STDTEACHRATIO4). The omitted 
category is STDTEACHRATIO1 
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Table A2: Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for the Prediction of 
Oportunidades Students’ Enrollment into Private School, for 
Mathematics test taker’s in the EXCALE06-2009, Controlling for 
Background Variables and state poverty level in a Multilevel Model. 
(N=2,954) 
Variable Coef. 
Std. 
Err. z P>z 
[95% 
Conf. Interval] 
Student-Level Variable 
      Female 0.60 0.65 0.92 0.360 -0.68 1.87 
Age in years 0.09 0.61 0.15 0.878 -1.10 1.28 
Preschool -1.05 2.33 -0.45 0.651 -5.63 3.52 
     Language spoken at home 
      Indigenous 3.17 6.43 0.49 0.622 -9.42 15.76 
Other language 0.46 2.06 0.22 0.824 -3.58 4.50 
     Mother’s Education 
      Primary school 0.91 3.21 0.28 0.778 -5.39 7.21 
Secondary school 1.17 3.18 0.37 0.713 -5.07 7.41 
High school 1.48 3.22 0.46 0.647 -4.84 7.79 
College 2.64 3.25 0.81 0.415 -3.72 9.00 
Graduate school 3.18 3.45 0.92 0.357 -3.59 9.95 
     Father’s Education 
      Primary school 1.48 2.28 0.65 0.518 -3.00 5.95 
Secondary school 0.56 2.17 0.26 0.796 -3.70 4.82 
High school 1.01 2.20 0.46 0.646 -3.30 5.32 
College 3.98 2.27 1.75 0.080 -0.47 8.42 
Graduate school 2.28 2.38 0.96 0.338 -2.38 6.93 
     Availability of Books at Home 
      Around 10 books 3.56 1.75 2.04 0.041 0.14 6.99 
Around 25 Books 4.41 1.78 2.48 0.013 0.93 7.90 
Around 50 books 3.57 1.76 2.03 0.042 0.13 7.02 
Around 100 books 3.84 1.78 2.16 0.031 0.35 7.34 
Around 200 books 4.28 1.84 2.32 0.020 0.67 7.89 
     Health Services Available to the 
Family 
      Family goes to popular or public clinic, or 
to a pharmacy 0.21 1.65 0.13 0.898 -3.03 3.45 
Family goes to IMSS, ISSSTE or similar 
institution 0.50 1.64 0.30 0.762 -2.71 3.70 
Family goes to private clinics and private 
health services 2.74 1.78 1.54 0.123 -0.75 6.23 
Computer at home 1.82 0.87 2.09 0.037 0.11 3.53 
Car at home 0.96 0.97 0.99 0.321 -0.94 2.86 
Telephone at home 0.47 0.91 0.52 0.603 -1.31 2.25 
State-Level Variable 
      Poverty 0.23 0.19 1.25 0.211 -0.13 0.60 
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…Continuation Table A2 
Variable Coef. 
Std. 
Err. z P>z 
[95% 
Conf. Interval] 
Interaction Terms 
      FemaleXPoverty -0.01 0.01 -0.63 0.526 -0.04 0.02 
AgeXPoverty -0.01 0.01 -0.98 0.329 -0.04 0.01 
PreschXPoverty 0.06 0.06 0.97 0.331 -0.06 0.18 
LANG2IXPoverty -0.10 0.18 -0.56 0.573 -0.45 0.25 
LANG3OXPoverty -0.01 0.05 -0.27 0.786 -0.10 0.08 
Mothsch2pXPoverty -0.01 0.06 -0.13 0.894 -0.13 0.11 
Mothsch3sXPoverty -0.01 0.06 -0.17 0.868 -0.13 0.11 
Mothsch4hXPoverty 0.00 0.06 -0.07 0.943 -0.13 0.12 
Mothsch5cXPoverty -0.01 0.06 -0.19 0.847 -0.14 0.11 
Mothsch6gXPoverty -0.03 0.07 -0.40 0.686 -0.16 0.11 
Fathsch2pXPoverty -0.05 0.05 -1.09 0.277 -0.14 0.04 
Fathsch3sXPoverty -0.03 0.04 -0.63 0.530 -0.11 0.06 
Fathsch4hXPoverty -0.03 0.04 -0.61 0.545 -0.11 0.06 
Fathsch5cXPoverty -0.08 0.05 -1.78 0.075 -0.17 0.01 
Fathsch6gXPoverty -0.04 0.05 -0.80 0.426 -0.13 0.06 
Books1XPoverty -0.06 0.03 -1.79 0.074 -0.13 0.01 
Books2XPoverty -0.08 0.04 -2.16 0.031 -0.15 -0.01 
Books3XPoverty -0.06 0.04 -1.71 0.086 -0.13 0.01 
Books4XPoverty -0.05 0.04 -1.48 0.139 -0.12 0.02 
Books5XPoverty -0.07 0.04 -1.77 0.077 -0.14 0.01 
Healthserv1XPoverty -0.02 0.04 -0.55 0.585 -0.09 0.05 
Healthserv2XPoverty -0.02 0.04 -0.46 0.643 -0.09 0.05 
Healthserv3XPoverty -0.04 0.04 -1.01 0.312 -0.12 0.04 
ComputerXPoverty -0.02 0.02 -1.10 0.270 -0.06 0.02 
CarXPoverty -0.01 0.02 -0.37 0.713 -0.05 0.03 
TelephoneXPoverty 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.931 -0.04 0.04 
Intercept 
-
11.48 8.53 -1.35 0.178 
-
28.20 5.24 
       
 
Log	  Likelihood	   -­‐575.7	  
  
 
Wald	  chi2	  (53)	   402.02	  
    Prob	  >	  chi2	   0.0000	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